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Article 4

Comments
Defendant Doe's Quest for Anonymity: Is the
Hurdle Insurmountable?
I. INTRODUCTION
On November 14, 1996, people around the country mourned the
death of Chicago's champion of social justice, Joseph Cardinal
Bernardin.1 Although Cardinal Bernardin died a hero, it was only a
few years earlier that he had been falsely accused of sexually abusing a
Cincinnati high school student while serving as Cincinnati's
archbishop. 2 The accuser ultimately dropped the charges, resulting in
the complete vindication of Cardinal Bernardin.3 However, this
vindication was not without the hardship of the malicious accusations
and the accompanying attacks from the press.4
Should Cardinal Bernardin, and anyone else falsely accused of
sexual abuse, be allowed to shield themselves from the hurtful and
damaging scrutiny resulting from such accusations?
Some
commentators argue that even if the charges ultimately prove baseless,
the allegations alone cause irreparable harm to the accused's reputation
and career. 5 Thus, some defendants in such cases suggest that they
should be allowed to proceed anonymously in order to protect
themselves against irreparable damage to their reputations or careers. 6

1. See Death Comes to the Cardinal,CHI. TRIB., Nov. 15, 1996, § 1, at 30.
2. See Colman McCarthy, The Bishops Don't Have a Prayer, WASH. POST, Nov. 20,
1993, at A23. On November 12, 1993, Stephen Cook filed a ten million dollar suit
against Cardinal Bernardin, alleging that Bernardin had abused him while he was a
teenager nearly twenty years earlier. See id.
3. See Paul Galloway, Cardinal Mourns Death of His Former Accuser, CHI. TRIB.,
Sept. 23, 1995, § 1, at 5. Cook withdrew his allegations in March of 1994, admitting
that they had no factual basis. See id.
4. See Memories May Be Recovered; Good Names Can't, NEWSDAY, Mar. 2, 1994, at
48, available in LEXIS, News Library, Newdy File (noting that although Cardinal
Bernardin claimed that he was "vindicated" by the withdrawal of the charges, the
"damage to his reputation has been done and the psychic hurt cannot be erased").
5. See id. "That sort of accusation is as dangerous as a loaded gun. Unleashing it in
public is as irrevocable as firing a bullet." Id.
6. See infra Part III.B (discussing cases where defendants have advanced these
arguments).
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Thirty years ago, "anonymous litigation" was virtually an unknown
term.7 However, once the Supreme Court gave its implicit sanction of
the use of pseudonyms in the early 1970s, 8 an onslaught of
anonymous litigation began. 9 Although the use of pseudonyms has
grown significantly in the past quarter century, its use is most
frequently sought by plaintiffs, not defendants.' Plaintiffs have
sought anonymity in cases where the issues involved were private,
stigmatizing, or so socially unpopular that the litigants
feared retaliation were their true identities to become known."
Juxtaposed against the growing desire for anonymity is the AngloAmerican tradition of public access to judicial proceedings.' 2 The
common law recognizes a "presumption of openness" with regard to
both criminal and civil proceedings, 3 as well as to public records and
documents.' 4
Thus, courts often are reluctant to permit
pseudonymous parties unless they are convinced that a substantial
privacy interest outweighs the presumption of openness.' 5 Not only
7. Adam A. Milani, Doe v. Roe: An Argument for Defendant Anonymity When a
Pseudonymous Plaintiff Alleges a Stigmatizing Intentional Tort, 41 WAYNE L. REV.
1659, 1660-61 (1995).
8. See, e.g., Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973).
9. See Milani, supra note 7, at 1662. The aftermath of Roe v. Wade and Doe v.
Bolton consisted of a "virtual explosion" in the number and types of actions brought by
anonymous plaintiffs. Id. The onslaught of cases succeeding Roe v. Wade and Doe v.
Bolton consisted of both cases challenging the constitutionality of federal and state
practices, and cases involving common law tort actions between private parties. See id.
at 1662-63.
10. See id. at 1664. Despite the growing number of cases in which plaintiffs seek
anonymity, few cases discuss the circumstances under which the courts should allow
anonymity. See id. Even fewer cases have discussed when, if ever, defendants should be
allowed to proceed anonymously upon their own requests. See id. See infra Parts III and
V (discussing the factors and considerations the court must weigh in determining when a
defendant should be granted anonymity).
11. See generally Joan Steinman, Public Trial, Pseudonymous Parties: When Should
Litigants Be Permitted to Keep Their Identities Confidential?, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (1985)
(discussing a variety of situations in which plaintiffs have been allowed to proceed
anonymously). See infra Part II.D (discussing plaintiff anonymity).
12. See Steinman, supra note 11, at 1-3 (discussing the tension between the
expansion of public access to judicial proceedings and the growing frequency of
anonymous litigation).
13. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 n.17 (1980). See
infra Part II.A (describing in more detail the common law right of access to trials and
other judicial proceedings).
14. See Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978). See infra
Part II.A (describing in more detail the common law emphasis on the public's right of
access to public records and documents).
15. See infra Parts II.D and III.B (discussing how most courts adopt a balancing test
when weighing a party's privacy interests against the constitutionally protected
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are courts reluctant to permit plaintiffs to proceed anonymously, but
they also are especially reluctant to allow defendants to proceed
anonymously, usually finding that the public's interest in open
6
proceedings outweighs the defendants' asserted privacy interests.
This Comment will address the fate of defendant-requested
anonymity in light of the growing practice of allowing plaintiff
anonymity, the common law presumption of openness, and the three
most recent state court decisions refusing to permit defendants to
proceed anonymously. The Comment begins by addressing the
common law tradition of openness in judicial proceedings and
documents.' 7 It then considers how this tradition of openness has
conflicted with society's desire to "privatize" litigation by keeping
parties anonymous throughout the course of the proceedings.' 8 The
Comment then describes the typical categories of cases in which
plaintiffs have been allowed to proceed anonymously, addressing the
reasons and analyses that underlie the courts' conclusions. 9 The
Comment then discusses defendant anonymity, analyzing prior cases
allowing defendant anonymity, in contrast to the three most recent state
cases directly disallowing defendant-requested anonymity.20 The
Comment analyzes the fate of defendant anonymity, suggesting a
proposal for courts to balance defendants' requests for anonymity
against the public's interest in disclosure, and ultimately, concluding
that defendants face an uphill battle in their requests for anonymity. 2'
II.BACKGROUND
A. The Common Law Presumption of Openness in American
Litigation
Firmly embedded in the American judicial system is a presumption
of openness in judicial proceedings.22 This presumption of openness

presumption of openness). See generally Steinman, supra note 11, at 1-23 (discussing
the historical tradition of openness in judicial proceedings and how the courts have dealt
with the tension between pseudonymous litigation and the presumption of openness).
16. See infra Part II1.B.
17. See infra Part II.A.
18. See infra Part 1l.B.
19. See infra Parts II.B, II.C, and lI.D.
20. See infra Part 111.
21. See infra Parts IV, V, and VI.
22. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 556 (1980) (noting
that criminal trials in both England and the United States have been presumptively
open).
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is rooted in both the English Common Law' and the Constitution.2'
The United States Supreme Court has held that trials are public events
where both private persons and the media have a right to be present.2
Openness in judicial proceedings promotes public scrutiny of the
judicial process, improves the quality of testimony, encourages public
respect for the judicial system, and provides therapeutic value to the
community.2" This right of access gives the public access to judicial
proceedings, such as trials, and to public records and documents.
Courts have held that this right of access includes the right to know the
identities of the parties involved in the litigation.' Once information
29
appears within the public record, the First and the Fourteenth
23. See Doe v. Diocese Corp., 647 A.2d 1067, 1070 (Conn. Super. CL 1994). "[Olne
of the most conspicuous features of English justice, that all judicial trails are held in
open court, to which the public have free access . . . appears to have been the rule in
England from time immemorial .
Id. (quoting E. JENKS, THE BOOK OF ENGuSH LAW
I..."
73-74 (6th ed. 1967)).
24. The Supreme Court has stressed that the First Amendment protections of freedom
of speech and press protect the public's right to attend trials, and prohibit the
government from limiting the information to which the public should have access. See
Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 576; see also U.S. CONST. amend I.
25. See Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947). The Court stated, "What
transpires in the court room is public property .... There is no special perquisite of the
judiciary which enables it, as distinguished from other institutions of democratic
government, to suppress, edit, or censor events which transpire in proceedings before
it." Id.
Although the Court has only specifically sanctioned the public's right of access to
trials in the context of criminal trials, the Court has indicated in dicta that the
presumption of openness extends to civil cases as well. See Richmond Newspapers, 448
U.S. at 569, 580 n. 17. The Richmond Newspapers Court indicated in a footnote that
both criminal and civil trials have historically been presumptively open. See id.; see
also Milani, supra note 7, at 1665-77 (discussing the Court's decisions regarding public
access to both criminal and civil trials). This presumption of openness in civil cases is
predicated on the First Amendment. See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 575-76; see
also Diocese Corp., 647 A.2d at 1070 (stating that "[tihe operation of the courts is
certainly an aspect of the functioning of government so that public access to court
proceedings should be protected on First Amendment grounds"); Steinman, supra note
11, at 3 (arguing that because the First Amendment applies in all litigation, a right of
access predicated upon the First Amendment has implications in both civil and criminal
arenas).
26. See Steinman, supra note 11, at 13-15.
27. See Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978).
However, this right of access is not absolute; courts are permitted to deny access where
files might become "vehicle[s] for improper purposes." Id. at 598. The Court stated that
the decision regarding access is one best left to the trial court's discretion and dependent
upon the facts and circumstances of each particular case. See id. at 599.
28. See, e.g., Doe v. Rostker, 89 F.R.D. 158, 162 (N.D. Cal. 1981); Doe v.
Deschamps, 64 F.R.D. 652, 653 (D. Mont. 1974).
29. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment reads in part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
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Amendments assure that the press and public have access to the
information. 0
B. The Rise of Anonymous Litigation
Prior to 1973, pseudonymous parties were virtually absent from
American litigation.3 ' However, with the Supreme Court's implicit
sanction of the use of pseudonyms in both Roe v. Wade3 2 and Doe v.
Bolton,3 3 an onslaught of pseudonymous litigation began.3 4
Originally, the cases allowing pseudonymous parties involved persons
who challenged the validity of state or federal laws. 5 However, as the
number of cases featuring pseudonymous parties increased, so did the
variety of cases. 36 To date, the courts have extended the grant of
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
30. See Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 494-95 (1975). The Court
recognized that the First and Fourteenth Amendments protect the press from liability for
publication of material found within the public record. See id. at 496. The Court noted
that if privacy interests were involved in judicial proceedings, then the states must
respond so as to avoid the public documentation of this private information. See id.
The Court stated that the states' "political institutions must weigh the interests in
privacy with the interests of the public to know and of the press to publish." Id.
3 1. See Milani, supra note 7, at 1660. Prior to 1969, only one Supreme Court case,
three court of appeals decisions, and one district court decision featured an anonymous
party as the sole or lead plaintiff. See id.
32. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). In this case, plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of a
Texas abortion law. See id. at 113. The Court sanctioned the use of "Jane Roe" as a
pseudonym by stating that no question existed as to her status as a real person with
standing, despite the presence of the pseudonym. See id. at 124.
33. 410 U.S. 179 (1973) (challenging a state abortion law).
34. See Milani, supra note 7, at 1662. Subsequent to the Wade decision, both the
number and the types of cases involving anonymous parties increased. See id. Figures
from 1994 indicate that eighteen federal court of appeals decisions, thirty-three district
court decisions, and fifty-seven state appellate court decisions featured anonymous
plaintiffs during that year. See id.
35. See id. at 1661; see, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (challenging a
Texas abortion law); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961) (challenging a Connecticut
contraception statute).
36. See Milani, supra note 7, at 1662-63. The majority of cases emerging in recent
years which feature anonymous parties are common law tort actions between private
parties. See id. These tort actions have the following two characteristics in common:
(1) the plaintiffs fear that potential social stigmas would attach to them were their
identities to become known and (2) the defendants in the cases are accused of committing
some kind of personal, intentional tort against the plaintiffs. See id. at 1663.
All the cases where anonymity has been involved require a departure from the usual
policy of disclosure in the complaint in order to protect plaintiffs from a threatened
harm, or to prevent publicity of an area of the "utmost intimacy." See Wendy M.
Rosenberger, Anonymity in Civil Litigation: The "Doe" Plaintiff,57 NOTRE DAME L.
REV., 580, 580 (1982).
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anonymity to parties in cases involving 39
abortion rights, 47
3 8 sexual harassment or abuse,
transsexuality, 0
homosexuality,
mental illness, 4' welfare rights, 42 drug testing, 43 HIV status,' medical
mistreatment, 45 challenges to governmental action,' and cases where
plaintiffs feared retaliation if their personal beliefs were to become
known. 47 The rise in pseudonymous litigation parallels a rise in both
the number of matters considered to be private, and the judicial
recognition of the so-called "right to privacy."'
37. See, e.g., Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973); Doe v. Ceci, 517 F.2d 1203 (7th Cir. 1975); Doe v. Mundy, 514 F.2d 1179 (7th
Cir. 1975); Doe v. Hale Hosp., 500 F.2d 144 (1st Cir. 1974); Doe v. Deschamps, 64
F.R.D. 652 (D. Mont. 1974).
38. See, e.g., Doe v. Department of Transp. Fed. Aviation Admin., 412 F.2d 674 (8th
Cir. 1969); Doe v. United Serv. Life Ins. Co., 123 F.R.D. 437 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Doe v.
Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), aff'd, 425 U.S. 901
(1976); Doe v. Chafee, 355 F. Supp. 112 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
39. See, e.g., Roe v. Borup, 500 F. Supp. 127 (E.D. Wis. 1980); Doe v. Union Pac.
R.R., 914 S.W.2d 312 (Ark. 1996); Doe v. Diocese Corp., 647 A.2d 1067 (Conn. Super.
Ct. 1994).
40. See, e.g., Doe v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 794 F. Supp. 72 (D.R.I. 1992); Doe
v. McConn, 489 F. Supp. 76 (S.D. Tex. 1980).
41. See, e.g., Doe v. Gallinot, 657 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1981); Doe v. Colautti, 592
F.2d 704 (3d Cir. 1979); Doe v. Harris, 495 F. Supp. 1161 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Doe v.
N.Y. Univ., 442 F. Supp. 522 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
42. See, e.g., Doe v. Carleson, 356 F. Supp. 753 (N.D. Cal. 1973); Doe v. Gillman,
347 F. Supp. 482 (N.D. Iowa 1972); Doe v. Lavine, 347 F. Supp. 357 (S.D.N.Y. 1972);
Doe v. Swank, 332 F. Supp. 61 (N.D. Ill.), affd sub nom. Weaver v. Doe, 404 U.S. 987
(1971); Doe v. Hursh, 337 F. Supp. 614 (D. Minn. 1970); Doe v. Shapiro, 302 F. Supp.
761 (D. Conn. 1969).
43. See Roe v. Cheyenne Mountain Conference Resort, Inc., No. 96-1086, 1997 WL
536061 (10th Cir. Sept. 2, 1997).
44. See, e.g., Doe v. Shady Grove Adventist Hosp., 598 A.2d 507 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1991); Doe v. Tris Comprehensive Mental Health, Inc., 690 A.2d 160 (N.J. Super.
Ct. 1996).
45. See Doe v. Conn. Dep't of Health, No. CV970569472, 1997 WL 491602 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Aug. 6, 1997); Doe v. Finch, No. 64131-5, 1997 WL 473966 (Wash. Aug.
21, 1997).
46. See Roe v. Office of Adult Probation, No. 96-9157, 1997 WL 546244 (2d Cir.
Sept. 8, 1997) (challenging the application of the state sex offender notification
policy).
47. See Doe v. Stegall, 653 F.2d 180 (5th Cir. 1981).
48. See Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 488 (1975) (recognizing that this
century has experienced a "strong tide" in favor of an individual's right to privacy). See,
e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516
(1960); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
The right of privacy arose as a result of a combination of increasing governmental
intrusion into private matters along with a growing willingness on the part of litigants
to protect their specific privacy interests. See Eugene R. Fidell, The Strange Case of
John Doe: Getting Anonymity in Federal Court, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 5, 1984, at 20. The
right to privacy protects the "personal intimacies of the home, the family, marriage,
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C. The Legal Basisfor Anonymity
1. The Federal Rules
Although the rise in pseudonymous litigation indicates that courts
will, in certain circumstances, permit parties to proceed anonymously,
the judicial authority for this procedure is not explicitly clear under the
Federal Rules. 49 The only mention made within the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure pertaining to the names of the parties is in reference to
pleadings. In federal court, complaints are required to include the
names of all parties.50 This rule is consistent with the American
tradition of open judicial proceedings 5' and serves both to apprise the
parties of the names of their opponents and to protect the public's
interest in knowing the facts of the proceedings.5 2
Some courts have adopted a strict interpretation of Rule 10(a),
requiring that the complaint specifically name the parties before the
court will recognize the commencement of the action.' Thus, when
motherhood, procreation, and child rearing." Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S.
49, 65 (1973).
49. See Lindsey v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 592 F.2d 1118, 1125 (10th Cir. 1979).
50. See FED. R. Civ. P. 10(a). Rule 10(a) provides:
Every pleading shall contain a caption setting forth the name of the court, the
title of the action, the file number, and a designation as in Rule 7(a). In the
complaint the title of the action shall include the names of all the parties, but
in other pleadings it is sufficient to state the name of the first party on each
side with an appropriate indication of other parties.
Id.
An exception to this rule is permitted where the true name of the defendant is unknown
by the plaintiff at the time of filing. In that instance, the plaintiff is permitted to use a
pseudonym in place of the defendant's name until his true name is discovered. See
Joseph E. Edwards, L.L.B., Annotation, Propriety and Effect of Use of Fictitious Name
of Party in Complaint in Federal District Court, 8 A.L.R. FED. 675, § 4[c] (1996).
. Rule 10(a) is consistent with the American tradition of open judicial proceedings. See
Rosenberger, supra note 36, at 584. Rule 10(a) serves to apprise the parties of the
names of their adversaries. See id.
5 1. See Rosenberger, supra note 36, at 584. "[F]iling a complaint under one's true
name is not only a procedural formality, but is also an acknowledgment of the openness
of the American judicial process. Any departure from this practice of full disclosure must
overcome the strong presumption against shielding identity from opposing parties and
the public." Id.
52. See, e.g., Doe v. Shakur, 164 F.R.D. 359, 360 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Free Mkt.
Compensation v. Commodity Exch., Inc., 98 F.R.D. 311, 312 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Doe v.
Deschamps, 64 F.R.D. 652, 653 (D. Mont. 1974).
53. See, e.g., Doe v. United States Dep't of Justice, 93 F.R.D. 483 (D. Colo. 1982);
Roe v. New York, 49 F.R.D. 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). For example, in Roe, the court
refused to permit the plaintiffs, four boys, ages fourteen to sixteen, to proceed
anonymously in their action against a New York state training school for failure to
provide them with adequate rehabilitative treatment. See Roe, 49 F.R.D. at 280. They
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parties seek anonymity, they are in a procedural dilemma-if they
follow Rule 10(a), they automatically reveal their identities; if they do
not, they risk dismissal of their case. Therefore, some courts have
developed procedural mechanisms to allow parties to commence an
action without breaking the procedural rules.- 4 For example, a
plaintiff seeking to proceed anonymously could proceed in one of the
following ways: 1) file a complaint featuring his true name, along with
a motion for a protective order,55 or for leave to amend to shield his
identity; 2) file a complaint under a pseudonym, but attach his true
name in an affidavit; or 3) file a complaint under a pseudonym, but
sign his true name, verifying the complaint.5 Some courts will grant
plaintiffs limited permission to commence the suit under a pseudonym,
but they request further memoranda demonstrating the need for
anonymity before issuing a more permanent protective order.57
However, a court still may dismiss a case or order the complaint
amended, if the court finds the plaintiff's reasons for requesting
anonymity insubstantial.
sought anonymity in the action for fear that revelation of their commitment to state
training schools would subject them to ridicule, harassment, embarrassment, and other
problems when reintegrating into the community. See id. at 280. The court found that
the complaint contained a "defect of substance" because it failed to identify the names of
the parties, and was therefore ineffective to commence the action. Id. at 282.
"[T]he plaintiff who employs a pseudonym gambles on how the court will interpret
Rule 10(a), and risks dismissal without even the opportunity to demonstrate why he
must conceal his identity." Rosenberger, supra note 36, at 582.
54. See, e.g., Roe, 49 F.R.D. at 281; Buxton v. Ullman, 156 A.2d 508, 514-15
(Conn. 1959). The proper procedure for obtaining the court's approval of an anonymity
request rests in the particular court's construction of Rule 10(a). See Rosenberger, supra
note 36, at 580.
55. The authority for the court to grant protective orders falls under Rule 26(c),
pertaining to discovery. This rule permits the court to issue a protective order in certain
circumstances to protect a party from "annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue
burden or expense." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
56. See Roe, 49 F.R.D. at 281-82. Another court recommended that the proper
procedure for proceeding under a pseudonym would be to inform the court of the party's
desire to proceed anonymously, establish the fact that the parties and issues are real,
despite the use of the pseudonyms, and secure the court's permission. See Buxton, 156
A.2d at 515. See also Doe v. Hallock, 119 F.R.D. 640, 645 (S.D. Miss. 1987) (noting
that the proper procedure for commencing an action pseudonymously would be to first
seek the court's permission or to move for a protective order upon the filing of the
complaint).
57. See Rosenberger, supra note 36, at 582. See also Gomez v. Buckeye Sugars, 60
F.R.D. 106 (N.D. Ohio 1973) (allowing the use of pseudonyms only until the court
determined whether or not the defendants were joint employers of the plaintiffs for
purposes of the action); Doe v. Diocese Corp., 647 A.2d 1067, 1072 (Conn. Super. Ct.
1994) (permitting the use of pseudonyms for the plaintiffs until the time of jury
selection when the decision would be subject to review).
58. See Hallock, 119 F.R.D. at 644-45. In Hallock, the plaintiff brought the action
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2. State Rules
Almost every state code of civil procedure follows the federal rule
and requires that complaints include the names of all the parties to the
action. 59 However, many states have gone beyond the federal rule,
recognizing certain substantive statutory exceptions to the general rule
of disclosure. For example, some states allow anonymity of
confidential proceedings in cases involving juveniles, ° sexual
63
62
molestation,61 sexually transmitted diseases, and matrimonial suits.
Illinois, in contrast to most states, has carved out a specific exception
to the general rule within its pleading statute, allowing parties to plead
under fictitious names for "good cause shown. '
as Jane Doe, failing to disclose her true identity in the complaint or in any attachments
thereto. See id.at 641-42. The court ultimately rejected her original complaint. See id.
at 645. The court then granted the plaintiff's request to amend the complaint to
substitute her true name for that of Jane Doe. See id.
59. See, e.g., ALA. Sup. Cr. C.P.R. 10(a); ARK. CT. C.P.R. 10(a); CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE § 422.40 (West 1995); COLO. CT. C.P.R. 10(a); DEL. SUPER. Cr. C.P.R. 10(a); GA.
CODE ANN. § 9-11-10(a) (1996); HAW. C.P.R. 10(a); IND. C.P.R. 10(a); KAN. Civ. PROC.
CODE ANN. § 60-210(a) (West 1994); LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 853 (West 1995);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 509.020 (West 1994); MONT. R.C.P. 10(a); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
§ 2010A (West 1994); OR. C.P.R. 10(a); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 15-6-10(a) (Michie
1994); N.C. R.C.P. 10(a); W. VA. C.P.R. 10(a); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 802.04(1) (West
1996).
60. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 48.78 (1994); Miss. Code Ann. § 43-21-251 (1994)
(allowing for confidentiality of juvenile court records); Miss. Code Ann. § 93-17-25
(1994) (providing for confidential adoption proceedings).
61. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:61B-I (West 1995). This statute does not allow
the names, addresses, and identities of victims or defendants to appear on the complaint,
and instead, it provides for fictitious names or initials to appear. Note that the New
Jersey Court of Appeals recently ruled that the statute is intended to protect the victims
of sexual molestation, and does not provide the defendant in such cases with the option
of proceeding anonymously upon his own motion. See T.S.R. v. J.C., 671 A.2d 1068,
1071 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996).
62. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 384.282 (West 1995) (providing for pseudonyms to
be substituted for the true names of the parties, with only the actual names being
revealed to the court in camera, with the court's instruction to seal the names from
further revelation).
63. See, e.g., N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 235(1) (McKinney 1995) (providing that
matrimonial suits be sealed).
64. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-401(e) (West 1996). Section 5/2-401(c)
provides: "A party shall set forth in the body of his or her pleading the names of all
parties for and against whom relief is sought thereby." Id. 5/2-401(c).
Section 5/2-401(e) provides: "Upon application and for good cause shown the parties
may appear under fictitious names." Id. 5/2-401(e). Although subsection (e) was
enacted in 1987, only one case to date, Doe v. Doe, 668 N.E.2d 1160 (Il1. App. CL),
appeal denied, 675 N.E.2d 632 (Ill. 1996) (This case will be referred to as Doe v. Doe due
to the numerous cases which include Doe as a party to the litigation), has attempted to
interpret the statute to determine what qualifies as "good cause shown." See infra notes
179-98 and accompanying text (discussing Doe v. Doe).
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3. The Lack of Clear Guidelines
Despite the growing number of anonymous cases and the lack of
clear statutory authority for granting anonymity, no clear guidelines
have emerged from the courts to aid in the determination of whether to
grant anonymity.6 5 Some courts discuss the competing policy
considerations surrounding the grant of anonymity, but they fail to
articulate clear standards for determining when anonymity requests
should be granted.6 6 Other cases fail to identify any reasoning with
regard to the granting of anonymity.67 In many of these .cases, this
failure is due to the fact that many courts' justifications for granting
anonymity are hidden in unpublished orders of the trial courts.6
Determining when to grant defendant-requested anonymity is
particularly ambiguous because the cases that do address anonymity do
so in the context of plaintiff-requested anonymity. 9 Instances of
defendant anonymity are rare except in two areas of the law: 1) suits
involving both anonymous plaintiffs and defendants, such as divorce
or child custody cases; 70 and 2) suits where plaintiffs designate the
defendant by a pseudonym because the defendant's true identity was
unknown at the time the suit was filed. 7' Although some courts have
allowed defendants to proceed anonymously, 72 the three most recent
cases directly addressing the propriety of the defendant-requested
anonymity have disallowed it. 73
65. See Milani, supra note 7, at 1677.
66. See Rosenberger, supra note 36, at 580. See infra Part IID. (describing the
various standards and tests utilized by the courts in determining when, if ever, to grant
anonymity requests).
67. See infra notes 123-35 and accompanying text.
68. See Robert G. Bagnall et al., Burdens on Gay Litigants and Bias in the Court
System: Homosexual Panic, Child Custody, and Anonymous Parties, 19 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 497, 548 (1984) (citing Fidell, supra note 48, at 20). Many cases involve
little or no discussion of why anonymity was allowed. See infra notes 123-35 and
accompanying text.
69. See Bagnall, supra note 68, at 552.
70. See id.
71. See id.; see also Steinman, supra note 11, at 18 (noting that both English and
American common law permitted the use of the pseudonym "John Doe" to designate a
defendant in a pleading until his real name became known, or to designate a plaintiff in
the action of ejectment).
72. See Bagnall, supra note 68, at 552. See also Steinman, supra note 11, at 18.
Note the distinction between defendant-requested anonymity and anonymous defendants.
Some defendants are anonymous merely because their identity is not known, or because
the revelation of their identity would also reveal the plaintiff's identity where the
plaintiff had requested anonymity.
73. See infra Part II.B (discussing more completely Doe v. Diocese Corp., 647 A.2d
1067 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1994); T.S.R. v. J.C., 671 A.2d 1068 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1996); and Doe v. Doe, 668 N.E.2d 1160 (Ill. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 675 N.E.2d 632

1997]

Defendant's Anonymity Hurdle

D. The Modern Courts' Approach to Plaintiffs' Anonymity Requests:
The Balancing Test
Considering the lack of clear statutory or judicial guidelines for
determining when to grant a party's anonymity request, courts are left
looking to each other for guidance on how to approach the issue.
Currently, most courts, in determining whether to grant a party's
anonymity request, utilize a balancing test, weighing the party's
privacy interests against the constitutionally embedded presumption of
openness in judicial proceedings.74 These courts recognize that,
although Rule 10(a) normally requires that the names of all the parties
appear in the complaint, this policy of disclosure may yield to protect
"privacy in a very private matter., 7 5 Although the majority of courts
use a balancing test when determining whether to grant a plaintiff's
request for anonymity, the same balancing test has resulted in varying
outcomes when put into practice.76 Thus, courts faced with similar
fact patterns have reached different results regarding the anonymity
question.77
1. Factors Courts Consider in Granting Anonymity
Courts often consider the following factors when considering
whether or not to grant the plaintiffs' requests for anonymity: (1)
whether the plaintiffs are forced to divulge "personal information of
the utmost intimacy;" (2) whether the plaintiffs have to admit to the
violation of state or other governmental regulations, or wish to engage
in prohibited conduct; (3) whether the plaintiffs are challenging the
constitutional, statutory, or regulatory validity of governmental action;
and (4) whether granting the plaintiffs anonymity would result in
substantial unfairness to the defendant.7" For example, in Southern
(I11.
1996) along with a number of cases allowing defendant anonymity).
74. See, e.g., Doe v. Frank, 951 F.2d 320, 323 (11th Cir. 1992); Coe v. United
States Dist. Court, 676 F.2d 411, 414 (10th Cir. 1982); Doe v. Stegall, 653 F.2d 180,
186 (5th Cir. 1981); Southern Methodist Univ. Ass'n v. Wynne & Jaffe, 599 F.2d 707,
712 (5th Cir. 1979); Free Mkt. Compensation v. Commodity Exch., Inc., 98 F.R.D.
311, 312-13 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Doe v. Deschamps, 64 F.R.D. 652, 653 (D. Mont.
1974).
75. Southern Methodist Univ., 599 F.2d at 713 (quoting Deschamps, 64 F.R.D. at
653).
76. See infra notes 90-115 and accompanying text.
77. See id.
78. See Southern Methodist Univ., 599 F.2d at 712-13. In summarizing these factors
for consideration, the Southern Methodist Univ. court attempted to compile
characteristics common to cases where plaintiffs had previously been granted
anonymity. See id. Similar factors have been considered by other courts when granting
plaintiffs anonymity. See, e.g., James v. Jacobson, 6 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1993). The
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Methodist University Ass'n v. Wynne & Jaffe, the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeal considered these factors in refusing to allow four female
plaintiffs to proceed anonymously in their Title VII action against two79
Dallas law firms for sex discrimination in hiring summer law clerks.
The plaintiffs feared that the revelation of their true names would
subject them to "embarrassment, annoyance, and economic loss.8o
Ultimately, the court refused to allow the plaintiffs to proceed
anonymously, failing to find either a congressional
grant warranting
8
anonymity or a sufficient privacy interest. '
Approximately ten years after the court's decision in Southern
Methodist University , the Fifth Circuit, in Doe v. Stegall,82 refined
its analysis of the anonymity question, finding that the characteristics
articulated in Southern Methodist University were not to be construed
as a rigid test for granting anonymity, but were merely factors to be
weighed in a balancing test.83 In Stegall, a mother and her two
children sought to proceed under fictitious names in their action
challenging the constitutionality of prayer and Bible exercises in
Mississippi public schools.' They sought to keep their identities
concealed for fear of harassment and violent reprisals against them due
Jacobson court identified the following factors as ones for consideration in the
anonymity determination:
[Wihether the justification asserted by the requesting party is merely to avoid
the annoyance and criticism that may attend any litigation or is to preserve
privacy in a matter of sensitive and highly personal nature; whether
identification poses a risk of retaliatory physical or mental harm to the
requesting party or even more critically, to innocent non-parties; the ages of
the persons whose privacy interests are sought to be protected; whether the
action is against a governmental or private party; and, relatedly, the risk of
unfairness to the opposing party from allowing an action against it to proceed
anonymously.
id.at 238.
79. See Southern Methodist Univ., 599 F.2d at 712-13. The action was brought by
the Southern Methodist University (SMU) Association of Women Law Students and four
female lawyers. See id.at 708-09.
80. Id. at 709. The plaintiffs also asserted that if their identities became known, they
would be assigned "less desirable matters" by their firms, their firms would lose
business, and other professionals subjected to the same kind of discrimination would be
hampered in their efforts to bring their cases for fear that they would also be subject to
the same kind of harassment, embarrassment or economic loss that faced these
plaintiffs. See id.at 711.
81. See id.at713.
82. 653 F.2d 180 (5th Cir. 1981).
83. See id. at 185-86. The court stated that it "would be a mistake to distill a rigid,
three-step test for the propriety of party anonymity from the fact-sensitive holding in
Southern Methodist [University] .... The opinion never purports to establish the three
common factors as a prerequisites to bringing an anonymous suit." Id. at 185.
84. See id.at 181.
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to their unpopular religious beliefs.85 The Fifth Circuit ultimately
granted the plaintiffs' anonymity status,' placing emphasis on the
following factors: (1) that the plaintiffs were challenging a
governmental activity; (2) that the case involved the plaintiffs' religious
beliefs, a fundamentally private matter; (3) that the plaintiffs could
expect extensive harassment and violent reprisals were their identities
to become known; 7 and (4) that the plaintiffs' status as children made
them especially vulnerable."8 Ultimately, the court considered all of
these factors in its "matrix of considerations," ruling that the Does'
privacy interests outweighed the "almost universal" practice of
disclosure. 89
2. Differing Results from the Balancing Process
a. Fear of Embarrassment
Although most courts agree that a balancing process is necessary to
weigh the public's interest in open judicial proceedings against the
plaintiff's privacy interests, courts disagree as to what qualifies as
substantial privacy interests warranting anonymity. 90 For example,
some courts deem personal embarrassment or humiliation insufficient
to warrant anonymous status in litigations. 9 In Doe v.
85. See id. at 182.
86. The district court in Stegall had found that it lacked jurisdiction over the suit. See
id. at 181.
87. The plaintiffs submitted several exhibits illustrating how they would be subject
to retaliatory harassment or violence were their identities to become known. See id. at
182 n.6.
88. See id. at 186.
89. Id. "We emphasize the special status and vulnerability of the child-litigants, the
showing of possible threatened harm and serious social ostracization based upon
militant religious attitudes, and the fundamental privateness of the religious beliefs, all
of which are at the core of this suit to vindicate establishment clause rights." Id. The
court also noted that it proposed "no hard and fast formula" for determining when a party
should be allowed to proceed anonymously. Id.
90. See infra notes 91-115 and accompanying text.
91. See Free Mkt. Compensation v. Commodity Exch., Inc., 98 F.R.D. 311, 313
(S.D.N.Y. 1983). In Free Mkt. Compensation, the plaintiffs sought to amend their
complaint to add an anonymous plaintiff, arguing that his identity had to remain
confidential to enable him to continue to supnly confidential information, and to ensure
that he would avoid economic harm, embarrassment, and humiliation in the community.
See id. at 312. The court failed to find that these considerations were sufficient to
warrant a granting of anonymity. See id. at 313. The court also stressed the practical
problems that pseudonymous litigation creates, including hindering the defendants in
their discovery requests and in establishing their defenses, and fixing res judicata
effects. See id. at 312. See also Doe v. Frank, 951 F.2d 320, 323 (1lth Cir. 1992)
(holding that the embarrassment a plaintiff might suffer from the revelation of his
alcoholism was insufficient to warrant a granting of anonymity).
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Shakur,9 a federal district court in New York refused to allow the
plaintiff, a victim of sexual assault, to proceed anonymously, holding
that the potential embarrassment and humiliation caused by revealing
the plaintiff's name did not outweigh the public's right to know all the
facts of the case, including the identity of the parties. 93 Additionally,
in a fairness calculation similar to that adopted by the court in Southern
Methodist University, the Shakur court concluded that the plaintiff
should be required to stand behind her charges publicly, rather than
hide behind a "cloak of anonymity. '
Similarly, a district court in Colorado found that potential
embarrassment of a public official was not enough to warrant granting
anonymity. 95 In Doe v. United States Departmentof Justice, the court
refused to allow a Colorado state judge to proceed anonymously in his
action to discover information gathered about him by the Drug
Enforcement Administration. 96 In this case, the plaintiff-judge feared
that revelation of his true identity would embarrass him, undermine his
privacy rights, and cast suspicion upon his office.97 The court
conducted a balancing test and ultimately denied the plaintiff's request
for a protective order shielding his identity, stating that the public had a
special interest in knowing the conduct of its public officials. 98
In contrast to the courts in both Shakur and Doe v. United States
Department of Justice, a district court in Wisconsin found that
embarrassment of being accused of sexual abuse was enough to
warrant anonymity. 99 In Roe v. Borup, the court permitted parents
accused of sexual abuse to proceed anonymously where they feared
"personal and social harassment and embarrassment" were their true
identities to become known.'I 0 The court granted the plaintiffs'
request for anonymity in their section 1983 action against the

92. 164 F.R.D. 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
93. See id. at 360.
94. Id. at 361. "Shakur has been publicly accused. If plaintiff were permitted to
prosecute this case anonymously, Shakur would be placed at a serious disadvantage, for
he would be required to defend himself publicly while plaintiff could make her
accusations from behind a cloak of anonymity." Id.
95. See Doe v. United States Dep't of Justice, 93 F.R.D. 483, 484 (D. Colo. 1982).
96. See id.
97. See id. The plaintiff argued that his duty as a judge included promoting "public
confidence in the integrity of the judicial system," and that this duty might be
compromised if his identity was revealed. Id.
98. See id. The court stressed the fact that lawsuits are "public events" where the
public has an interest in knowing all the facts, including the identity of the parties. Id.
99. See Roe v. Borup, 500 F. Supp. 127, 130 (E.D. Wis. 1980).
100. Id.
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Department of Health and Social Services.' 0 ' The court stressed that
the Department's "allegedly false charges of sexual abuse" constituted
a sensitive issue warranting anonymity.' 2 The court found that the
plaintiffs had established "an important privacy interest" sufficient to
warrant the granting of anonymity."3
b. Fear of Retaliation
Courts are also in disagreement as to whether fear of retaliation or
reprisal is sufficient to warrant a grant of anonymity'3 4 In Gomez v.
Buckeye Sugars,'0 5 a federal district court in Ohio found that fear of
retaliation from one's employer prompted the need for anonymity."
In Gomez, the court permitted the use of pseudonyms where the
plaintiffs feared possible reprisals from their employers for alleging
violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act.'07 The Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals also permitted plaintiffs to proceed anonymously in Doe v.
Stegall,"m where the plaintiffs feared reprisal due to their unpopular
religious beliefs.' 9
In contrast, however, the Fifth Circuit found that fear of retaliation
from one's employer was not sufficient to permit the plaintiffs to
proceed anonymously." 0 In Southern Methodist University, the court
refused to allow the female plaintiffs to appear anonymously in their
action for employment discrimination even though the female plaintiffs
asserted that they would suffer reprisals from their employers."'
101. See id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 130. The court also noted that the parents had already suffered
psychological harm due to the defendant's actions. See id.
104. See infra notes 105-115 and accompanying text.
105. 60 F.R.D. 106 (N.D. Ohio 1973).
106. See id. at 107.
107. See id. The court permitted the use of pseudonyms only until the court resolved
the issue of whether the defendants were joint employers of the plaintiffs for purposes of
the lawsuit. See id.
108. 653 F.2d 180 (5th Cir. 1981). See supra notes 82-89 and accompanying text
(discussing Stegall).
109. See Stegall, 653 F.2d at 186. The court noted that "religion is perhaps the
quintessentially private matter .... Evidence on the record indicates that the Does may
expect extensive harassment and perhaps even violent reprisals if their identities are
disclosed to a Rankin County community hostile to the viewpoint reflected in the
plaintiffs' complaint." Id.
110. See Southern Methodist Univ. Ass'n v. Wynne & Jaffe, 599 F.2d 707, 711 (5th
Cir. 1979). See also supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text (discussing Southern
Methodist Univ.).
111. See Southern Methodist Univ., 599 F.2d at 711. The women feared that they
might be assigned "less desirable" work by their employers and that their firms might
lose business if their identities became known. Id.
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Similarly, a federal district court in California held that the plaintiffs'
fears of reprisal due to their unpopular beliefs concerning the draft and
war did not constitute a protectable privacy interest warranting
anonymity." 2 In Doe v. Rostker, the plaintiffs sought to bring an
action against the Selective Service for possession of unlawful
information in violation of the Privacy Act.'" 3 The plaintiffs sought
anonymity for fear of retaliatory conduct that could have jeopardized
their efforts to obtain conscientious objector status in the future." 4
The court ultimately rejected the plaintiffs' '' request,
finding their fears
5
of retaliation "speculative and prospective."
c. Substantial Privacy Interest
Although personal embarrassment, economic loss, or fear of
retaliation, may be insufficient to outweigh the judicially embedded
presumption of openness in the balancing test, a substantial privacy
interest will tilt the scale in favor of anonymity." 6 In many cases,
anonymity will be granted if the plaintiff can demonstrate an
overwhelming need for confidentiality and can illustrate that this right
to privacy outweighs both the public's interest in knowing the identity7
of the litigants and any potential unfairness to the defendant."1
Examples of substantial privacy interests include matters that are of "a
sensitive and highly personal nature," such as birth control, abortion,
illegitimacy, and homosexuality. "8 Other factors that may tilt the scale
in favor of anonymity include the following: (1) the possibility of
retaliatory physical or mental harm to the moving party; (2) the age of
the moving party; (3) the risk of unfairness to the defendant; and (4)
whether the opposing party is a private person or a governmental
9
entity. "'

112. See Doe v. Rostker, 89 F.R.D. 158, 161 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
113. See id. at 159.
114. See id. at 162.
115. Id.
116. Doe v. Deschamps, 64 F.R.D. 652, 653 (D. Mont. 1974). See supra Part II.B
(citing cases where anonymity has been granted).
117. See Anonymity of Parties, 3 FED. LIT. 68, May 1994, at 69, available in
WESTLAW, Fedlit database. "It will be important for the moving party to show that the
reason for anonymity is to preserve privacy in a matter that is sensitive and highly
personal, not merely to avoid the annoyance or criticism that may result from having
one's identity made known." Id.
118. Deschamps, 64 F.R.D. at 652.
119. See Anonymity of Parties,supra note 117, at 69.
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III. DISCUSSION
Despite the growing trend in plaintiff anonymity and the increasing
number of cases addressing whether anonymity is warranted, few
cases to date have directly addressed the propriety of defendantrequested anonymity. 2 ' Although the three most recent cases directly
addressing the propriety of defendant-requested anonymity ultimately
denied it,'2 ' earlier cases illustrate that defendants have been allowed to
proceed anonymously in certain circumstances." 2
A. Prior Cases Allowing Defendant-RequestedAnonymity
Although the three most recent cases squarely addressing the
propriety of defendant-requested anonymity refused to allow it, prior
cases illustrate that defendants have been granted anonymous status in
the past."23 Many of these cases feature both pseudonymous plaintiffs
and pseudonymous defendants 24 and involve situations in which both
parties would be subject to "social stigmatization" if their true identities
were revealed." 2 Some cases involve sexual abuse,' 26 transmission of
sexual diseases, 27 abortion, 28 surrogate mothers' 29 an attorney's
coercing a client into having sexual relations with him, 3 ' and the
unauthorized dissemination of information regarding a person's HIV
status.13 ' Although defendants have been granted anonymity in many
120. See infra notes 121-198 and accompanying text.
121. See Doe v. Diocese Corp., 647 A.2d 1067 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1994); T.S.R. v.
J.C., 671 A.2d 1068 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996); Doe v. Doe, 668 N.E.2d 1160
(I1l. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 675 N.E.2d 632 (II!. 1996). See infra notes 151-98 and
accompanying text (discussing these three cases and the courts' reasonings with regard
to defendant-requested anonymity).
122. See infra notes 123-150 and accompanying text.
123. See Milani, supra note 7, at 1698-1705. Because many of the cases featuring
anonymous defendants mention anonymity only in a footnote, or not at all, it is
difficult to discern whether it was the plaintiff or the defendant who requested anonymous
status. Additionally, the cases provide little guidance as to why anonymity was granted.
124. See Bagnall, supra note 68, at 552.
125. Milani, supra note 7, at 1702.
126. See, e.g., Roe v. Doe, 28 F.3d 404 (4th Cir. 1994); Doe v. Doe, No. C-920809,
1994 WL 79555 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 16, 1994), rev'd, Doe v. Doe, 639 N.E.2d 432
(Ohio 1994); Doe v. Doe, 878 P.2d 1161 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); Doe v. Roe, 596
N.Y.S.2d 620 (App. Div. 1993).
127. See, e.g., Doe v. Roe, 841 F. Supp. 444 (D.D.C. 1994); Doe v. Roe, 598
N.Y.S.2d 678 (Q. CL 1993); Doe v. Roe, 267 Cal. Rptr. 564 (CL App. 1990).
128. See Doe v. Roe, 551 N.Y.S.2d 75 (App. Div. 1990).
129. See Doe v. Doe, 421 S.E.2d 913 (Va. Ct. App. 1992).
130. See Doe v. Roe, 958 F.2d 763 (7th Cir. 1992).
131. See Doe v. Roe, 599 N.Y.S.2d 350 (App. Div. 1993); Doe v. Roe, 444 N.W.2d
437 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989).
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cases, the courts' permission of the use of pseudonyms is usually
132
implicit, as courts mention the use of pseudonyms only in passing,
in a footnote, 33 or not at all.134 As a result, little guidance exists for
future courts and litigants regarding what qualifies as a sufficient
reason for granting anonymity. 135
The cases featuring anonymous defendants that contain some36
discussion of the propriety of the defendant's request for anonymity'
are cases involving either a defendant corporation 37 or a juvenile
defendant. 38 For example, in Doe v. A Corp.,139 the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals noted in a footnote that the district court had granted
the defendant corporation's motion to proceed anonymously in order
to prevent the disclosure of confidential information concerning the
corporation." In A Corp., the plaintiff, a former in-house counsel to
132. See, e.g., Suppressed v. Suppressed, 565 N.E.2d 101, 102 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990)
(mentioning that the caption appeared as it did due to the trial court's granting of the
defendant's motion seeking to impound the court record and to have both parties in the
case proceed anonymously). Suppressed involved allegations by a woman plaintiff
claiming that her attorney in her divorce action had "psychologically coerced" her into
having sexual relations with him, in violation of his fiduciary duty. Id.
133. See Prudential Ins. Co. v. Doe, 76 F.3d 206, 207 n.2 (8th Cir. 1996)
(mentioning in a footnote that the "Doe" names were pseudonyms); Doe v. Roe, 841 F.
Supp. 444, 446 n.4 (D.D.C. 1994) (noting in a footnote that the complaint and other
documents containing confidential material had been sealed to protect the privacy of the
parties); Doe v. Roe, 267 Cal. Rptr. 564, 565 n.l (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (noting in a
footnote: "By stipulation of the parties and order of this court the parties have been
designated by fictitious names to protect their privacy."); Doe v. Roe, 400 N.Y.S.2d
668, 671 n.l (Sup. Ct. 1977) (mentioning in a footnote that the file had been sealed and
pseudonyms had been used in the title and in other documents).
134. See, e.g., Doe v. Roe, 958 F.2d 763 (7th Cir. 1992) (involving claims of
improper sexual inducement by a divorce attorney with no mention in the opinion of the
use of pseudonyms); Doe v. Roe, 345 N.Y.S.2d 560 (Sup. Ct. 1973) (involving the
unauthorized release of confidential information with no mention of the use of
pseudonyms); Doe v. Roe, 598 N.Y.S.2d 678 (J. Ct. 1993) (involving sexually
transmitted diseases with no mention of the use of pseudonyms).
135. See supra notes 123-34 and accompanying text (featuring anonymous parties,
but failing to articulate any reason for the pseudonyms).
136. Even these discussions are brief and do not discuss the standards or factors that
courts should consider in ruling upon these anonymity requests. See infra notes 138-50
and accompanying text.
137. See Steinman, supra note 11, at 81 (noting that defendant corporations often
request pseudonym status in order to protect confidential information from being
revealed). See infra notes 139-42 and accompanying text (discussing Doe v. A Corp.).
138. See Steinman, supra note 11, at 63 (noting that juveniles make up one of the
categories of cases in which parties request pseudonyms, and that the pseudonymous
party is usually the defendant, rather than the plaintiff).
139. 709 F.2d 1043 (5th Cir. 1983).
140. See id. at 1045 n.l. The court stated:
To prevent identification of the company and the possible disclosure of
confidential information concerning its affairs, the district court granted the
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"A Corp.," brought an action against the corporation for benefits
allegedly due to him pursuant to the company's pension and life
insurance plans. 4 ' Defendant "A Corp" then moved to seal the record
and require the suit to be continued anonymously. 4
The few other examples where the court has given some justification
43
for the use of pseudonyms for defendants involve criminal cases,1
most of which concern juvenile offenders.'" For example, in United
States v. Doe,145 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals sanctioned the
district court's granting of the defendant's motion to protect his
identity because the defendant was a government witness, serving a
long prison sentence.46 The court recognized that the use of the
pseudonym could protect the defendant from potential bodily harm if
other inmates were to discover his cooperation with the government. 47
In another case captioned "United States v. Doe,"'" the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals sanctioned the use of a pseudonym for the
defendant-appellant who had moved pursuant to the Federal Youth
Corrections Act to have his record of conviction expunged. 49 The
court noted that the use of the pseudonym was approved to prevent
unnecessary dissemination of information regarding the juvenile's
conviction that had been set aside.15
defendant corporation's motion to seal the record; require the suit to be
prosecuted without revealing the name of either the lawyer or the corporation;
and enjoin Doe and his co-counsel from pursuing any actions arising out of the
facts on which his suits were based, communicating with other persons to
induce them to bring a similar action, and disclosing or using any information
Doe gained during his employment by the corporation.
Id.
141. See id. at 1044-45.
142. See id. at 1045.
143. See infra notes 145-50 and accompanying text.
144. Protecting the confidentiality of juvenile offenders serves a two-fold purpose:
(1) to avoid stigmatizing the juvenile, and (2) to encourage rehabilitation. See
Steinman, supra note 11, at 64.
145. 655 F.2d 920 (9th Cir. 1980).
146. See id. at 922 n.l. The original opinion did not contain pseudonyms. Once the
decision was made to publish the opinion, however, the defendant moved for anonymity
to protect his identity. See id.
147. See id. The court, in a detailed footnote, identified the situations warranting the
granting of anonymity, concluding that pseudonyms were often utilized to protect the
party from "harassment, injury, ridicule or personal embarrassment .
I..."
Id. The court
then concluded that the defendant had presented the "unusual case" warranting
anonymity. Id.
148. United States v. Doe, 556 F.2d 391 (6th Cir. 1977).
149. See id. at 393. The court recognized the use of the pseudonym at the end of the
opinion. See id.
150. See id.; see also United States v. Indian Boy X, 565 F.2d 585, 587 n.4 (9th Cir.
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B. Defendants' Pleasfor Secrecy Stifled
In recent years, three state courts have directly addressed the
propriety of granting defendants anonymity. All three courts followed
a balancing test and ultimately denied the defendants' requests.
1. Doe v. Diocese Corp.
In one of the first cases to directly address the propriety of a
defendant's request for anonymity, a Connecticut state court denied
anonymity to a clergyman accused of sexual abuse. 151 In Doe v.
Diocese Corp., both the plaintiff and the defendants moved for
protective orders to shield their identities in the case. 52 The plaintiff,
claiming to have been the victim of sexual abuse by a clergyman," s
requested anonymity, fearing shame and humiliation from public
exposure of his abuse." 5 The defendant clerical institutions sought
anonymity on behalf of both the institutions and the clergyman accused
of the abuse, 55 arguing that the unproven and serious allegations of
sexual abuse would undermine the public trust necessary for the
proper operation of their schools, social service programs, and
fundraising activities. 5
The Connecticut Superior Court addressed each of the parties'
requests for anonymity separately, noting that the granting of
anonymity to one party did not necessarily warrant the granting of
anonymity to the other party.' 57 The court then adopted a balancing
1977) (permitting the use of the pseudonym in an effort to "protect the identity of the
appellant in the spirit of the Juvenile Delinquency Act").
15 1. See Doe v. Diocese Corp., 647 A.2d 1067, 1075 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1994).
152. See id. at 1070. Each party requested to proceed anonymously, at least until the
time of jury selection, when the trial judge would reassess the propriety of continuing
the use of pseudonyms. See id.
153. See id. at 1068. This alleged sexual abuse first occurred when the plaintiff was
twelve and continued for a period of twelve years. See id. The plaintiff claimed that in
addition to the "hundreds" of acts of abuse, the clergyman also supplied him with
alcohol and marijuana during his high school years. Id.
154. See id. at 1069. The plaintiff testified to paying for his own therapy in an effort
to keep his employer from learning of his prior sexual abuse and his drug and alcohol
abuse as a minor. See id. In addition, the plaintiff's therapist testified that public
revelation of the plaintiff's identity "would result in the plaintiff having to spend a
tremendous amount of time in overcoming his feelings of shame and humiliation as
opposed to seeing himself rather as a person who has been hurt by a perpetrator." Id.
155. See id. The institution sought to be identified as the "W church corporation."
Id. Anonymity was requested for the clergyman in order to shield the identity of the
institution for which he worked. See id.
156. See id.
157. See id. at 1073. The court noted that a "quid pro quo" analysis was not
appropriate when trying to weigh a party's request for anonymity against the public's
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test, reviewing each case for anonymity in light of the public's interest
in open court proceedings."
Although the court granted the plaintiff's request for anonymity,"
the court ultimately denied the defendants' request, stressing the
public's overriding interest in the operation of a large religious
organization.'" Although the court placed primary emphasis on the
public's right to know, its analysis was similar to the analysis
conducted in conjunction with the plaintiff's request.' 6 ' First, the
court noted that an institution, unlike a private person, cannot claim
harm to a substantial privacy interest. 162 Second, the court advanced a
"slippery-slope" argument, noting that any charitable or religious
institution brought into court could request anonymity based upon
potential harm to its activities.' 63 Third, the court noted that the church
failed to provide adequate proof of the potential damage that could
result from the disclosure of its name.164
interest in open access to the courts. Id.
158. See id. at 1070. The court did note, however, that the right to know the identity
of the parties is not "perfectly symmetrical" with the right to attend trials. Id. at 1071
(quoting Doe v. Stegall, 653 F.2d 180, 185 (5th Cir. 1981)). "[Plseudonym status
neither obstructs nor interferes with the public's view of the 'issues joined or the court's
performance in resolving them."' Id. (quoting Stegall, 653 F.2d at 185). However, the
court recognized that the request to proceed under a pseudonym did implicate "important
rights that the public has to full access to information about court proceedings." Id.
159. See id. at 1072. The court granted the plaintiff anonymity in light of the
intimate and personal nature of his past sexual abuse, the fact that the abusive
relationship involved the illegal use of drugs and alcohol, and the fact that the plaintiff
expressed real concern for the potential shame and humiliation that would result from
public exposure. See id. at 1074.
160. See id. at 1074. "It seems to the court that the public has an interest in the
functioning and operation of large religious or charitable institutions whose activities
in some cases, such as here, affect the lives of thousands of people." Id. The Diocese
Corp. court analogized the situation of the religious institution's request for anonymity
to the request mounted by a state judge in Doe v. United States Department of Justice, 93
F.R.D. 483 (D. Colo. 1982). See id. In United States Department of Justice, the court
denied the judge's request, noting that "the public interest in the conduct of its business
by public officials is of paramount importance." United States Dep't of Justice, 93
F.R.D. at 484.
161. See Diocese Corp., 647 A.2d at 1073-74 (discussing the factors involved in the
court's decision to refuse the defendants pseudonym status). See supra notes 78-119 and
accompanying text (detailing the factors for the courts' consideration in a plaintiff
anonymity analysis).
162. See Diocese Corp., 647 A.2d at 1073.
163. See id. at 1074. The court expressed the following concerns: "Should the
protection be granted to cases where sexual or racial discrimination is alleged? Should
the decision turn on the amount of charitable activity engaged in by the defendant
institution; is a storefront church entitled to less protection than a larger religious
institution?" Id.
164. See id. The court noted that the potential harm alleged by the defendants was
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2. T.S.R. v. J.C.
Similar to the Connecticut court in Diocese Corp., a New Jersey
state court also refused to allow a minister to proceed anonymously in
a case involving allegations of sexual abuse. 165 In T.S.R. v.J.C.,
two plaintiffs brought an action for sexual abuse against their former
minister, J.C., whom they claimed had sexually abused them from
1979 through 1982.166 The defendant, J.C., moved the court to
shield his identity, arguing that the case would release to the public
meritless and baseless allegations that might damage his life,
reputation, and family. 167 J.C. also claimed that the plaintiffs were
improperly using the threat of public disclosure as an incentive to
induce settlement.168
At issue in the case was a New Jersey statute providing that the
names and identities of both the victim and defendant in sexual abuse
cases be kept confidential. 69 The court ultimately looked to the "true
legislative intent" behind the statute to determine that the statute was
primarily concerned with protecting the victim's rights rather than
those of the defendant sexual abuser. 170
Thus, despite the existence of a state statute explicitly providing for
plaintiff and defendant anonymity, the court still refused to grant the
defendant anonymity status.171 In its decision, the Superior Court of
New Jersey placed much emphasis on the presumption of openness in
judicial proceedings. 172 In addition, the court reasoned that because
speculative as to both its nature and its extent. See id. Numerous allegations similar to
those mounted against this church and diocese had been made in many states and
communities, causing the harm that might result from the disclosure of this church's
name to be speculative. See id. Although the court ultimately refused to issue a
protective order to the defendants, the court noted that the issue of a defendant
institution requesting anonymity remained "unsettled," due to the absence of cases
addressing the propriety of defendants' requests. Id. at 1075.
165. See T.S.R. v. J.C., 671 A.2d 1068, 1076 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996).
166. Id. at 1070. The plaintiffs initiated their action under a New Jersey sexual
molestation statute against the minister, J.C., and the church officials and hierarchy
supervising J.C. See id. They claimed that they had been abused while they were
between the ages of eleven and thirteen. See id.
167. See id. at 1074. Defendant J.C. requested an order that would require that the
complaints be either dismissed or sealed, prohibit the plaintiffs from filing any other
documents revealing his identity, and impose sanctions upon the plaintiffs. See id. at
1070.
168. See id. at 1074.
169. See id. at 1071.
170. Id. at 1071-72.
171. See id. at 1076.
172. See id. at 1072-75. The court noted that only juvenile proceedings and other
"rare" cases warrant the withholding of the litigants' identities. Id. at 1073. The court
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J.C., a minister with a sense of responsibility to the public, had been
accused of criminal activity, the public had a substantial interest in
knowing his identity. 73 The court also considered a number of other
policy factors that weighed against granting the defendant
anonymity.' 74 Like the Diocese Corp. court, the T.S.R. court relied
on a "slippery-slope" argument, noting that the granting of a protective
order in that instance would have comported with allowing all
defendants accused of sexual abuse the right to proceed
anonymously. 75 Additionally, the court noted that withholding the
defendant's name actually might work to his detriment, overly
persuading the jury of his guilt merely by virtue of shielding his
name.176 If the allegations mounted against J.C. ultimately proved
meritless, the public nature of the records and proceedings would help
contribute to his exoneration.' 77 Finally, the court noted that revelation
of the true names would ensure that no other individual or entity would
be falsely accused of the allegations." s

stressed the values of open proceedings, including the fact that they sharpen public
scrutiny of the judicial process, increase confidence on the part of the public in the
operation of the judiciary, enhance the value of judicial proceedings, and provide for
informed discussion of judicial operations. See id. at 1074 (quoting Steinman, supra
note 11, at 36).
173. See id. at 1074. Persons with responsibilities to the public, such as doctors and
lawyers, have a "'reduced expectation of privacy as to some matters because the public
has a legitimate interest in their activities."' Id. (quoting Steinman, supra note 11, at
84). The public has a great interest in knowing who has acted in a criminal manner, or
who has violated professional ethics. See id. (citing Steinman, supra note 11, at 85).
174. See id. at 1075. In addition to policy considerations warranting against a grant
of anonymity, the court also considered the fact that the church had already disseminated
information to members of the congregation discussing the allegations, thus
undermining the need for confidentiality from other members of the public. See id. at
1072.
175. See id. at 1074.
If, as J.C. suggests, these mere accusations are tantamount to an irreparable
injury sufficient to outweigh the public's interest in open proceedings, then
he is really asking us to effectively grant all defendants accused of sexual
abuse in civil cases the right to defend anonymously, a result which hardly
comports with a philosophy granting anonymity only in rare circumstances.
Id.
176. See id. at 1075. The court stated, "[the] '[d]efendant might well be... perceived
as a wrongdoer by the very fact of anonymity alone."' id. (quoting A.B.C. v. XYZ
Corp., 660 A.2d 1199, 1204 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995)).
177. See id.
178. See id. "[Dlisclosure eliminates the danger that individuals or entities not
connected with the litigation might be wrongfully perceived as involved and damaged by
insinuation." Id.
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3. Doe v. Doe
Another public figure was refused anonymity in a sexual
molestation case when the Illinois Appellate Court ruled that a
defendant-attorney accused of sexual molestation did not demonstrate a
privacy interest sufficient to justify shielding his identity from public
scrutiny.' 79 In Doe v. Doe, the plaintiff, niece of the defendant,
brought an action that accused the defendant of sexually molesting her
from 1987 through 1993 while she was a minor.'8 ° The defendant
requested an order prohibiting the plaintiff from disclosing his name in
the pleadings, relying on section 2-401(e) of the Illinois Code' 8' that
provides parties with the option of appearing under fictitious names for
"good cause shown."'" The defendant argued that the plaintiff was
improperly using the threat of disclosure as inducement to settle, and
that revelation of his true identity would result in embarrassment,
humiliation, and harm to his reputation and family." 8
Because neither the legislative history nor case law defined what
constituted "good cause" as required by section 2-401(e)," the court
looked to case law from both Illinois and other state and federal courts
to determine whether the defendant should have been allowed to
proceed anonymously.'" 5 The court ultimately adopted a balancing test
similar to that used in other jurisdictions to evaluate the propriety of the
defendant's request.'86

179. See Doe v. Doe, 668 N.E.2d 1160, 1168 (Il1. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 675
N.E.2d 632 (III. 1996). The Illinois Supreme Court refused to hear John Doe's appeal,
letting the decision of the appellate court stand. See Doe v. Doe, 675 N.E.2d 632 (Ill.
1996).
180. See Doe v. Doe, 668 N.E.2d at 1162.
181. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-401(e) (West 1992). See supra note 64 (providing
the text of section 5/2-401(e)).
182. Doe v. Doe, 668 N.E.2d at 1162. Although the plaintiff initially filed the
complaint under fictitious names at the defendant's request, she later moved to have the
pleadings bear her correct name. See id.
183. See id. John Doe's motion alleged that "'disclosing John Doe's true name or
identity would cause defendant embarrassment, humiliation and detriment to his
reputation in the community and profession' and "'would cause severe and permanent
damage to defendant's wife and . . . children."' Id. (quoting defendant's ex parte
emergency motion requesting an order prohibiting the plaintiff from disclosing the
defendant's name in any pleadings filed).
184. See id. at 1164, 1167. The court noted that since the provision's passage in
1987, no Illinois case had interpreted section 2-401(e). See id. at 1164. Additionally,
the legislative history surrounding House Bill 474, in which subsection (e) was
proposed, did not mention the meaning of "good cause." See id. at 1167.
185. See infra notes 187-190 and accompanying text.
186. See Doe v. Doe, 668 N.E.2d at 1167.
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Illinois case law revealed that although some courts have allowed
anonymous parties in the past, many failed to explicitly explain their
rationale in permitting the use of pseudonyms. 87 The court then
looked to the federal system, recognizing that anonymity has been
granted by the federal courts in circumstances involving substantial
privacy interests." The court ultimately relied on both Diocese Corp.
and T.S.R., adopting much of the New Jersey court's reasoning in
T.S.R.' 89 Following T.S.R., the Doe v. Doe court failed to find that
Doe had illustrated the "good cause" or any kind of protectable privacy
interest, sufficient to justify him proceeding under a fictitious name.'
Similar to the T.S.R. court, the Doe v. Doe court advanced a
"slippery slope" argument, noting that, because any professional
named in a civil suit could assert harm to reputation, the defendant had
failed to distinguish himself from any other individual sued for

187. See id. at 1164. The court looked to the court's opinion in Doe v. Lutz, where
the only mention of the use of the pseudonym was in a footnote to the caption, which
stated: "'Throughout this opinion, we use for plaintiffs' actual names the pseudonyms
under which these cases were filed .... Plaintiffs ... requested anonymity based upon a
concern for 'Richard's' present mental condition. We have opted to honor that
request."' Id. (quoting Doe v. Lutz, 668 N.E.2d 564, 564 n.1 (Ill. App. Ct.), appeal
denied, 671 N.E.2d 729 (I11.1996)).
The court then looked to the brief justification for the use of pseudonyms found in
Suppressed v. Suppressed, where the court stated:
Prior to the filing of plaintiff's complaint, defendants filed a suit in chancery
to obtain an order requiring that the complaint in this case be filed without
revealing the names of the parties and that the court record be impounded.
Such an order was obtained ex parte . . . . For this reason the case has
proceeded under the above caption rather than the actual names of the parties.
Id. (quoting Suppressed v. Suppressed, 565 N.E.2d 101, 102 (III. App. Ct. 1990)).
188. See id. at 1164-65. The court noted that federal courts grant anonymity only in
"exceptional" cases where the presumption of openness in judicial proceedings is
outweighed by a substantial privacy interest. id. at 1165. The court noted that
anonymity had been granted in situations involving abortion, homosexuality, mental
illness, transsexuality, and religion, but not in situations where only embarrassment or
economic well-being were at stake. See id. (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973);
Coe v. United States Dist. Court, 676 F.2d 411 (10th Cir. 1992); Doe v. Frank, 951 F.2d
320 (11th Cir. 1982); Doe v. Stegall, 653 F.2d 180 (5th Cir. 1981); Southern Methodist
Univ. Ass'n. v. Wynne & Jaffe, 599 F.2d 707 (5th Cir. 1979); Doe v. Colautti, 592 F.2d
704 (3d Cir. 1979); Doe v. McConn, 489 F. Supp. 76 (S.D. Tex. 1980); Doe v.
Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), aff'd, 425 U.S. 901
(1976)).
189. See id. at 1165-67. The court noted that Doe's arguments were "virtually
identical" to those presented by the minister in T.S.R. v. J.C., 671 A.2d 1068, 1072-75
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996). Id. at 1167.
190. Id. The court held that the "damage caused by these allegations to defendant's
reputation, personally or professionally" could not amount to a "protectable privacy
interest." Id.

166

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 29

damages.' 9' Additionally, the court noted that the interests of victims
of sexual abuse differ substantially from those of the abuser."9 The
court stressed that the public's need to know who has been accused of
sexual abuse is greater than the need to know who has been a victim of
sexual abuse."9
The court in Doe v. Doe also noted that because the defendant in the
case was a prominent Chicago attorney, other practical concerns might
arise if the defendant were allowed to proceed anonymously."9 First,
the court noted that shielding the defendant's identity would make it
difficult for the trial judge and other members of the court tO determine
whether or not to recuse him or herself. 195 Additionally, if the
allegations proved true, the defendant then would be subject to
criminal investigations 96 and disciplinary investigations by the
Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission. 97 Finally, the
court noted that revealing the defendant's identity would assure that no
one else would be wrongly perceived as the defendant."9
IV. ANALYSIS

The uncertain standards guiding plaintiff anonymity, policy
considerations favoring open judicial proceedings, and the courts'

191. See id.
It seems to this court that any doctor sued for medical malpractice, any lawyer
sued for legal malpractice, or any individual sued for sexual molestation can
assert that the plaintiff's allegations will cause harm to his reputation,
embarrassment and stress among his family members, and damage to his
business as a result of the litigation.
Id.
192. See id.
193. See id.
194. See id. at 1168.
195. See id. at 1167.
196. See id. at 1168. The court noted that the parties were in disagreement as to
whether a criminal investigation that had been commenced was still ongoing. See id.
197. See id.
198. See id. The court stated,
[W]ith the parties having already revealed that defendant is plaintiffs uncle by
marriage, a lawyer in the Chicago area, and the subject of a past or current
criminal investigation, full disclosure of both parties' names eliminates the
possibility that some other individual may be wrongly perceived as accused or
involved in this litigation.
Id.
Ultimately, the court reversed and remanded the case, thus allowing the plaintiff leave
to file an amended complaint, substituting the parties' real names in place of the
pseudonyms. See id.
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most recent decisions refusing to grant defendants anonymity all point
to a bleak future for defendant-requested anonymity.
A. ProblemsFacing Both Plaintiffand DefendantAnonymity
1. Practical Concerns
Multiple practical considerations arise when plaintiffs are granted
anonymous status."9 Courts have been concerned that the presence of
a pseudonymous plaintiff will hinder judicial processes such as
discovery, 200 motion practice," jury selection, 202 execution to enforce
money judgments,"3 and fixing res judicata. 0 4 In addition, an
unidentified plaintiff impedes the defendant's ability to establish his
defenses,2 0 5 counterclaims, 2 6 and privileges, 2 7 and to impeach the
plaintiff's credibility.' 0 Although many of these practical concerns
can be resolved through such methods as disclosure among the parties
or identification in camera to the court,2° they cannot remedy the fact
that the presence of pseudonyms conflicts with the public's
constitutionally protected right to know, 2' 0 and the firmly embedded
199. See infra notes 200-08 and accompanying text.
200. See Lindsey v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 592 F.2d 1118, 1125 (10th Cir. 1979);
Free Mkt. Compensation v. Commodity Exch., Inc., 98 F.R.D. 311, 313 (S.D.N.Y.
1983); T.S.R. v. J.C., 671 A.2d 1068, 1072 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996); A.B.C.
v. XYZ Corp., 660 A.2d 1199, 1201 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995).
201. See T.S.R., 671 A.2d at 1073; A.B.C., 660 A.2d at 1199.
202. See T.S.R., 671 A.2d at 1073; A.B.C., 660 A.2d at 1204 (noting that voir dire
jury selection would require the revelation of the names in open court).
203. See T.S.R., 671 A.2d at 1073; A.B.C., 660 A.2d at 1201.
204. See Coe v. United States Dist. Court, 676 F.2d 411, 415 (10th Cir. 1982);
Lindsey, 592 F.2d at 1125; Doe v. Rostker, 89 F.R.D. 158, 162 (N.D. Cal. 1981); Roe
v. Ingraham, 364 F. Supp. 536, 541 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
205. See Coe, 676 F.2d at 415; Lindsey, 592 F.2d at 1125; Free Mkt. Compensation,
98 F.R.D. at 313.
206. See Free Mkt. Compensation, 98 F.R.D. at 313.
207. See id.
208. See James v. Jacobson, 6 F.3d 233, 241 (4th Cir. 1993).
209. See Bagnall, supra note 68, at 549 n.221. Amendments to a complaint or
protective orders could also serve to eliminate some of the procedural difficulties by
revealing to the court and the defendant the identities of the parties, while still shielding
them from the public. See id. See also Roe v. New York, 49 F.R.D. 279, 281 (S.D.N.Y.
1970) (noting that once an action has been commenced by the filing of a complaint with
the true identities of the parties revealed, the names of the parties could be protected by
an amendment or protective order).
210. See Free Mkt. Compensation, 98 F.R.D. at 313. The Free Mkt. Compensation
court rejected the plaintiff's offer to reveal John Doe's identity in camera, noting that it
is the public, not the court, which has an interest in the disclosure of the parties'
identities. See id. "The public's interest in an open judicial process is no more served
by an in camera disclosure than by the use of the pseudonym itself." Id.
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practice of disclosing the identities of the parties upon commencement
of the lawsuit.2" '
2. The Importance of the Public's Right of Access
"Typically, participants in the legal system cannot treat the
courtroom as a masquerade ball, lowering their masks and revealing
'
their faces only when it suits them."212
Despite the fact that the
number of cases in which anonymity has been requested and granted
by the court has increased steadily over the past thirty years,23
opposition to pseudonymous litigation remains strong.2 4 Many
believe that the whole idea of anonymous litigation squarely conflicts
with the constitutionally protected presumption of openness in judicial
proceedings. 2 5 Some believe that if a plaintiff chooses to bring her
action in court, then she consequently
forfeits her privacy interests by
216
opting for a public forum.
"Anonymous litigation" is all but an oxymoron in our system,
as litigation American-style is a quintessentially public act. For
the plaintiff, it reflects a decision to forego private means of
dispute resolution ...

in favor of a public, governmental arena.

For the defendant, it means disclosure of what had been private
grievances-often personal and thoroughly embarrassing-to
the glare of public scrutiny. For both sides, the commencement
of civil litigation has historically meant the end of privacy.217
For example, the trial judge in Doe v. Bodwin,218 a case involving
allegations of sexual abuse committed by a psychologist, refused to
211. See Steinman, supra note 11, at 18. See also supra notes 22-30 and
accompanying text (discussing the presumption of openness in American judicial
proceedings).
212. Ken Armstrong & Laurie Cohen, Abuse Case Puts a Noted Name on Trial, CHI.
TRIB., Aug. 18, 1996, § I, at 9 (noting that the use of pseudonyms is normally reserved
for minors and for adults when the issues litigated involve "highly personal matters").
213. See supra notes 31-48 and accompanying text.
214. See generally Steinman, supra note 11, at 18-35 (discussing the concerns raised
by pseudonymous litigation).
215. See, e.g., id. at 18.
216. See, e.g., Doe v. Shakur, 164 F.R.D. 359, 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). "[Pllaintiff
has chosen to bring this lawsuit. She has made serious charges and has put her
credibility in issue. Fairness requires that she be prepared to stand behind her charges
publicly." Id. See also Steinman, supra note 11, at 33. "Those who oppose
pseudonymous litigation argue that a plaintiff, by initiating litigation, automatically
waives any right to keep his identity confidential from the public, his adversary, or the
court." Id. The normal procedure for commencing an action is to identify oneself in
front of the court, the adversary, and the public at large. See id.
217. Scott L. Winkelman, Keeping Confidences, THE RECORDER, Aug. 28, 1995, at
6, available in LEXIS, News Library, Recrdr File.
218. 326 N.W.2d 473 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982).
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allow the plaintiff to proceed anonymously," 9 stating, "I would hate to
think that anybody can come into our courts... with a hood over their
face and make accusations against other people ....,120 Although
this trial court's decision was ultimately overturned on appeal as an
abuse of discretion, 22 ' other courts have adopted similar reasoning,
recognizing that fairness considerations often weigh heavily against
granting a party anonymous status. 2
Even though concerns about privacy have been increasing, the
public's right to know usually outweighs these privacy interests. 2 3
Courts have held consistently that the identities of the parties are
among the facts that the public has a right to know. 224 Additionally,
shielding the identities of the litigants from the public's view
undermines some of the policy values served by open access to judicial
proceedings.225 Although not all the benefits derived from an open
judicial process are harmed by the use of pseudonyms, 22 6 many of the
219. See id. at 475. In Bodwin, the plaintiff, who claimed that her psychologist had
sexual intercourse with her during therapy, sought anonymity for fear that publicity
surrounding her case would jeopardize her emotional stability. See id. at 474-75.
220. Id. at 476. The trial judge stressed that coming into the courtroom meant
coming into a "public theater" where it would be unfair to allow plaintiffs to proceed
anonymously. See id.
22 1. See id. The court recognized that a proper exercise of discretion might have lead
to the granting of the plaintiff's motion for a protective order. See id.
222. See Doe v. Shakur, 164 F.R.D. 359, 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (noting that because
the plaintiff had put her credibility in question with her serious allegations, fairness
required that she assert her allegations publicly); see also Southern Methodist Univ.
Ass'n v. Wynne & Jaffe, 599 F.2d 707, 713 (5th Cir. 1979) ("Basic fairness dictates
that those among the defendants' accusers who wish to participate in this suit as
individual party plaintiffs must do so under their real names.").
223. See Joel R. Brandes & Carole L. Weidman, Privacy: Whose Right Is It Anyway?,
N.Y. L.J., Oct. 24, 1995, at 3. Despite the fact that "sensational reporting" has led to
concerns on the part of the "victimized," the public's right to know "ordinarily
outweighs the privacy of individuals." Id. See also Mark Lawson, The Visible Price of
Fame, INDEPENDENT (London), Mar. 7, 1995, at 17. "For 'anonymity' and 'silence' are
dead concepts in our culture, disappearing from the legal system and gone completely
from general living." Id.
224. See Shakur, 164 F.R.D. at 361; Doe v. Rostker, 89 F.R.D. 158, 162 (N.D. Cal.
1981); Doe v. Deschamps, 64 F.R.D. 652, 653 (D. Mont. 1974); see also Free Mkt.
Compensation v. Commodity Exch., Inc., 98 F.R.D. 311, 313 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (noting
that it is the public that has an interest in knowing the identities of the parties rather
than the court).
225. See Steinman, supra note 11, at 18-19.
226. See Doe v. Stegall, 653 F.2d 180, 185 (5th Cir. 1981).
The equation linking the public's right to attend trials and the public's right to
know the identity of the parties is not perfectly symmetrical. The public right
to scrutinize governmental functioning (citation omitted) is not so
completely impaired by a grant of anonymity to a party as it is by closure of
the trial itself. Party anonymity does not obstruct the public's view of the
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other benefits of public observation of court proceedings are hindered
if the public does not have knowledge of the parties' identities.227
First, the community is not able to scrutinize the participants' conduct
in the litigation in the manner it would were the identities known.228
Not knowing the identity of the parties also impedes the public's
ability to investigate whether bias or corruption played a part in the
litigation. 229 Third, the public's confidence in the judicial system,"3
as well as the therapeutic value served by open proceedings, might be
compromised by keeping a party's identity secret."
3. Unclear Guidelines
Due to the hesitancy in granting plaintiffs anonymnity 2 2 and the fact
that the decision is left in the trial court's discretion, 2 no clear rule
has developed with regard to requests for anonymity. 234 For example,
issues joined or the court's performance in resolving them.
Id. See also Steinman, supra note 11, at 18 (noting that "[tihe public and press are as
free to attend, observe, and report the courtroom proceedings in pseudonymous
litigation as they are in any other litigation").
227. See Steinman, supra note 11, at 16-20. Steinman notes that in addition to
contradicting the tradition of identified parties, anonymous litigation undermines many
of the values served by open judicial proceedings. See id. at 18. Open civil proceedings
serve the following purposes: (1) the presence of spectators serves as a safeguard
against judicial abuses of power and assures litigants a fair determination of the facts; (2)
open proceedings improve the quality of testimony, discouraging perjury, and
encouraging witnesses to come forward; (3) open proceedings build confidence and
respect in judicial operations; and (4) open proceedings serve a therapeutic value for the
community. See id. at 16-17.
228. See id. If the party is a public figure, the community might be more inclined to
scrutinize his or her activities, assuring fairness throughout the proceeding. See id. If
the names are kept confidential, the public would be unable to conduct this extra
scrutiny. See id. See also Doe v. United States Dep't. of Justice, 93 F.R.D. 483, 484 (D.
Colo. 1982) (noting that because Doe was a public figure, the public had a greater
interest in knowing about his conduct).
229. See Steinman, supra note 11, at 19.
230. See id. The fairness of the proceeding may be undermined if the public suspects
that the secret identity of the party played a role in the outcome of the case. See id.
231. See id.
232. Most courts recognize that anonymity should only be granted in rare, unusual,
or exceptional cases. See, e.g., Lindsey v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 592 F.2d 1118, 1125
(10th Cir. 1979) (recognizing that allowing a plaintiff to proceed anonymously is "an
unusual procedure" that should only be utilized to protect an important privacy interest);
Doe v. Deschamps, 64 F.R.D. 652, 653 (D. Mont. 1974) ("We think that as a matter of
policy the identity of the parties to a lawsuit should not be concealed except in the
unusual case.").
233. See Lindsey, 592 F.2d at 1125.
234. See Doe v. Stegall, 653 F.2d 180, 186 (5th Cir. 1981) ("We advance no hard and
fast formula for ascertaining whether a party may sue anonymously."). See also supra
notes 78-119 and accompanying text (discussing the various factors courts consider in
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Doe v. Diocese Corp. 35 held that the stigma attached to being the
236
victim of sexual abuse was sufficient to warrant anonymous status,
whereas Doe v. Shakur237 held that it was not. 238 Gomez v. Buckeye
Sugars2 39 held that fear of reprisals from employers for bringing a
controversial lawsuit was enough to warrant anonymity, 240 whereas
Southern Methodist University Ass'n v. Wynne & Jaffe24 ' held that it
was not.242 Some courts identify factors that should be weighed in the
balancing test for determining the appropriateness of anonymity, but
they do not identify which factors are the most important
considerations or how the actual balancing test should take place.243
The most solid advice a future court could take from past anonymity
cases is to utilize a balancing test, weighing all the varying
considerations of the cases, and applying its "informed discretion" to
reach a conclusion. 244
B. Arguments for Defendant Anonymity
The future of defendant anonymity remains less clear than the future
of plaintiff anonymity, due to the scant number of cases discussing the
propriety of defendant anonymity and the fact that the recent trend of
cases refuses to allow anonymity to public figures. 245 However, none
of the cases discussing either defendant or plaintiff anonymity has
directly stated that the privilege of proceeding anonymously is to be
afforded only to plaintiffs. The extensive number of cases featuring
anonymous plaintiffs and defendants indicates that courts have been
quite willing to grant defendants anonymous status in the past.2'
weighing anonymity requests)..
235. 647 A.2d 1067 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1994). See supra notes 151-64 and
accompanying text (discussing Diocese Corp).
236. See Diocese Corp., 647 A.2d at 1072.
237. 164 F.R.D. 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
238. See id. at 362.
239. 60 F.R.D. 106 (N.D. Ohio 1973).
240. See id. at 107.
241. 599 F.2d 707 (5th Cir. 1979). See supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text
(discussing Southern Methodist University).
242. See id. at 713; see also Doe v. Hallock, 119 F.R.D. 640, 641-42, 645 (S.D.
Miss. 1987) (refusing to allow an employee to proceed anonymously in her Title VII
action against her employer for sexual harassment and discrimination).
243. See Doe v. Stegall, 653 F.2d 180, 186 (5th Cir. 1981).
244. James v. Jacobson, 6 F.3d 233, 242 (4th Cir. 1993).
245. See supra Part III (discussing the three most recent decisions regarding defendant
anonymity, and prior case law illustrating situations where it has been granted, either
implicitly or explicitly by the courts).
246. See supra notes 123-150 and accompanying text. Note that because little
discussion is given as to the propriety of the courts' permission of the use of
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Both Diocese Corp. and Doe v. Doe indicate that plaintiffs' and
defendants' requests for anonymity are to be evaluated separately.24
Both cases held that the fact that the plaintiff has or has not been
granted anonymity does not figure into the calculus where the
defendant's request is concerned. 2 4 Additionally, Diocese Corp.,
T.S.R. v. J.C., and Doe v. Doe all adopted a balancing test similar to
that utilized by courts considering plaintiffs' requests for anonymity,
weighing the
defendants' interests in privacy against the public's right
24 9
of access.
Another factor in favor of defendant anonymity is the fact that
fairness to the defendant has been a major consideration in many
courts' decisions regarding plaintiff anonymity. 2 Courts are not only
concerned that the defendant's efforts would be hampered by shielding
the identity of the plaintiff, 25 ' but they also are concerned that the
defendant might suffer a disadvantage by having to defend against his
claims publicly, while the plaintiff can hide behind a "cloak of
anonymity. 252 Some courts fear that the mere presence of a
pseudonyms in these instances, these cases give little guidance to courts assessing
defendant anonymity.
247. See Doe v. Diocese Corp., 647 A.2d 1067, 1073 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1994).
Parties cannot agree between themselves as to whether one or both should
have pseudonym status, and the fact that pseudonym status has been given to
one party, does not mean that the other party is entitled to identical treatment.
The court must make its determination by weighing the request for anonymity
of each party separately against the public interest in open access to the
courts.
Id. See also Doe v. Doe, 668 N.E.2d 1160, 1167 (I11.
App. Ct.), appeal denied, 675
N.E.2d 632 (I11.
1996).
248. See Diocese Corp., 647 A.2d at 1073 (noting that a "quid pro quo" analysis was
not proper where each party's request must undergo a balancing test against the public's
interest in access); Doe v. Doe, 668 N.E.2d at 1167.
249. See Diocese Corp., 647 A.2d at 1072 (adopting a balancing test and relying on
the standards set forth in plaintiff anonymity cases, including Southern Methodist
University Ass'n v. Wynne & Jaffe, 599 F.2d 707 (5th Cir. 1979), Doe v. Hallock, 119
F.R.D. 640 (S.D. Miss. 1987), and Doe v. Rostker, 89 F.R.D. 158 (N.D. Cal. 1981));
T.S.R. v. J.C., 671 A.2d 1068, 1073 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996) (adopting a
balancing test for defendant anonymity and relying on the precedent set for plaintiff
anonymity in Doe v. Stegall, 653 F.2d 180 (5th Cir. 1981), Doe v. Frank, 951 F.2d 320
(1 th Cir. 1992), and A.B.C. v. XYZ Corp., 660 A.2d 1199 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1995)); Doe v. Doe, 668 N.E.2d at 1165-67 (adopting a balancing test and relying on
the courts' decisions in Diocese Corp., 647 A.2d 1067, T.S.R. v. J.C., 671 A.2d 1068
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996), and other plaintiff anonymity cases such as Coe v.
United States DistrictCourt, 676 F.2d 411 (10th Cir. 1982)).
250. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
251. See supra notes 200-208 and accompanying text (discussing the practical
problems resulting from anonymous litigation, including an inability to complete
discovery, establish defenses, or plead res judicata).
252. Doe v. Shakur, 164 F.R.D. 359, 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
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pseudonym might unfairly lend credence to the plaintiff's claims
against the defendant.7 Thus, many courts follow the reasoning first
set forth in Southern Methodist University, holding that basic fairness
considerations dictate that plaintiffs making serious allegations against
defendants must do so publicly. 21 Courts have recognized that the
defendant5 has a strong interest in knowing the identity of his
25
accuser.

Some argue that, in light of the courts' recognition that defendants
often face serious accusations that could result in serious harm to their
reputations and careers, defendants should be given the opportunity to
remain anonymous."56 The stigmatization that could result from an
accusation such as sexual abuse, might be so great that anonymity is
warranted to protect the defendant's privacy interest until the
allegations can be adjudicated in court.
Even if the accusation is
later withdrawn, or the defendant is exonerated, the emotional or
psychological damage has already been done. 2-8 One commentator has
253. See A.B.C., 660 A.2d at 1204; see also James v. Jacobson, 6 F.3d 233, 240
(4th Cir. 1993) (noting that the district court stressed the fact that the jury might infer
from the use of the pseudonyms that the plaintiff's claims against the defendant had
merit).
254. See Southern Methodist Univ., 599 F.2d at 713 ("[Tjhe mere filing of a civil
action against other private parties may cause damage to their good names and
reputation and may also result in economic harm. Basic fairness dictates that those
among the defendants' accusers who wish to participate in this suit as individual party
plaintiffs must do so under their real names."); Hallock, 119 F.R.D. at 644; Free Mkt.
Compensation v. Commodity Exch., Inc., 98 F.R.D. 311, 313 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
255. See, e.g., Doe v. Rostker, 89 F.R.D. 158, 162 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
256. See generally Milani, supra note 7, at 1698-1707 (arguing that defendants
accused of a stigmatizing intentional tort have a privacy interest sufficient to warrant a
granting of anonymity).
257. See id. at 1698; see also Roe v. Doe, 28 F.3d 404, 409 (4th Cir. 1994) (K.K.
Hall, J. concurring) (recognizing that corroboration of the plaintiff's claims of sexual
abuse is necessary "in light of the stigma associated with even the accusation that an
adult has sexually abused a child .... "); Roe v. Borup, 500 F. Supp. 127, 130 (E.D.
Wis. 1980) (allowing parents accused of sexual abuse to proceed anonymously in their
action against the Department of Social Services due to the "personal and social
harassment and embarrassment" that might result if their identities became known);
Armstrong & Cohen, supra note 212, § 1, at 32 (noting that the defendant's attorney in
Doe v. Doe had argued that the public accusation alone could destroy the defendant's
reputation and hurt his family, resulting in social stigma, and that no valid purpose
could be served by publicizing the allegations before they were deemed valid).
258. See Memories May Be Recovered; Good Names Can't, supra note 4, at 48. In
reference to the false allegations against Joseph Cardinal Bernardin, the authors noted,
"[Tihe damage to his reputation has been done and the psychic hurt cannot be erased."
Id.; see also Bagnall, supra note 68, at 556 (stressing the irreversibility of disclosure,
arguing that "once the cat is out of the bag, it cannot be put back in").
In a letter written by a St. Louis Archdiocese priest recently accused of sexual abuse,
the priest wrote:
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suggested that, "[i]f the alleged act is so stigmatizing that a
plaintiff/victim's privacy interest requires the use of a pseudonym, is
not being accused of committing that act even more stigmatizing to the
alleged perpetrator?"259 Thus, fairness might require that a defendant
should be allowed to proceed under a pseudonym in instances where
the plaintiff has been allowed to do so.
C. Arguments Against Defendant Anonymity
Despite the arguments in favor of defendant anonymity, defendants
might still face an almost insurmountable battle in their efforts to keep
their identities confidential. First, defendants do not have the same
concerns that face plaintiffs who wish to remain anonymous.260
Anonymous litigation initially sprung from a need on the part of
plaintiffs to enable them to have their rights adjudicated in court, while
still preserving their privacy interests. 26 ' Anonymous litigation
encourages litigants, who might otherwise be deterred from exercising
their right to sue for fear that they might be stigmatized or humiliated,
to bring their cases to court.262 Defendants cannot seek anonymous
litigation for this reason because they are not exercising their right to
sue, but are being sued.
Although all three cases directly addressing defendant-requested
anonymity, Diocese Corp., T.S.R., and Doe v. Doe, conducted a
I was deeply wounded, shocked and stunned when I learned last week that an
anonymous lawsuit had been filed against me. Yes, the accuser is hiding
behind the protective cloak of anonymity. The coward didn't even have the
guts to put his own name on the lawsuit; but he made sure mine was displayed
for everyone to see.
Letter from St. Louis priest to various members of the St. Louis Catholic community 1
(Sept. 19, 1996) (on file with the author). Note that this allegation was later withdrawn.
259. Milani, supra note 7, at 1698.
260. See Doe v. Deschamps, 64 F.R.D. 652, 653 n.l (D. Mont. 1974) ("The problem
of anonymous plaintiffs involves considerations entirely different from those
involving 'John Doe' defendants.").
261. See Steinman, supra note 11, at 33. Plaintiffs should not have to choose
between asserting their substantive rights in court or forfeiting their privacy interests.
See id.
262. For example, homosexuals might be deterred from challenging discrimination
for fear that public knowledge of their homosexuality would lead to social
stigmatization. See Bagnall, supra note 68, at 547. Thus, anonymity is necessary to
allow them to "break out of a vicious cycle in which they do not protest legally
cognizable injuries for fear of only making things worse and in which the failure to
protest in turn leaves intact a system of extensive discrimination." Id. See also Bossier
City Med. Suite, Inc. v. City of Bossier, 483 F. Supp. 633, 644 (W.D. La. 1980) (noting
"the chilling effect of publicly airing so private a matter as the decision to terminate a
pregnancy may well preclude a pregnant woman from seeking vindication of her
constitutional rights in Federal court").
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balancing test similar to that utilized by courts weighing plaintiffs'
requests for anonymity, these three courts placed more emphasis on
the public's right of access where defendant anonymity was at
stake. 263 All three courts stressed the public's overriding interest in
knowing the activities of public figures,2 4 or the identities of those
accused of wrongdoing. 265 Because all three of the cases involved
public figures, whether it was a minister or an attorney, about whom
the public had a special interest in knowing, the courts ultimately
found that the public's interest outweighed the defendants' privacy
interests. 26 Such public figures also might be the ones most likely to
request anonymity to protect their reputations from public scrutiny.
Additionally, the only privacy interests the defendants could assert
in Doe v. Diocese Corp., T.S.R., or Doe v. Doe was harm to their
reputations and personal embarrassment, both of which have been
consistently rejected by the courts as not being sufficient privacy
interests.267 Even courts that have recognized "fairness to the
defendant" as a factor in their anonymity analyses did not suggest that
both the plaintiffs and the defendants in the case should be allowed to
proceed anonymously. 2 68 Rather, stressing the public's interest in
knowing all the facts, the courts refused to grant the plaintiffs'
requests for anonymity and ordered both parties to proceed under their
true names.269

263. See supra Part III.B.
264. See Doe v. Diocese Corp., 647 A.2d 1067, 1074 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1994)
(noting that the public has a special interest in the operation of large religious or
charitable organizations); T.S.R. v. J.C., 671 A.2d 1068, 1074 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1996) (noting that public figures have a reduced expectation of privacy by virtue of
their societal roles). Other cases also have noted that the public has a greater interest in
knowing the activities of public figures. See Coe v. United States Dist. Court, 676 F.2d
411, 418 (10th Cir. 1982) (refusing to allow a doctor under investigation by the
Colorado State Board of Medical Examiners to shield his identity because of the public's
interest in knowing the facts of the proceedings of the Board); Doe v. United States
Dep't of Justice, 93 F.R.D. 483, 484 (D. Colo. 1982) (denying anonymity to a state
judge, arguing that the public had a great interest in the "conduct of its business by
public officials").
265. See Doe v. Doe, 668 N.E.2d 1160, 1167 (I11.App. Ct.) (recognizing that the
public has a greater interest in knowing who has been accused of sexual abuse than in
knowing who has been a victim), appeal denied, 675 N.E.2d 632 (I11. 1996); T.S.R.,
671 A.2d at 1074 (noting that there is a greater public interest in knowing who may be a
threat to the community, and in knowing who has been accused of criminal conduct).
266. See supra Part III.B.
267. See supra notes 91-98 and accompanying text.
268. Southern Methodist Univ. Ass'n v. Wynne & Jaffe, 599 F.2d 707, 713 (5th Cir.
1979); Doe v. Shakur, 164 F.R.D. 359, 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
269. See Southern Methodist Univ.. 599 F.2d at 713.
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Finally, policy considerations dictate against granting defendants
anonymity. Both T.S.R. and Doe v. Doe advanced a "slippery-slope"
argument against granting defendants anonymity, indicating that if
embarrassment or harm to reputation or career was sufficient to
warrant anonymity, almost any defendant could invoke such a
privilege. 27 0 Additionally, if the harm for which the defendant is
accused is so substantial and stigmatizing, then the identity of the
defendant would serve to prevent someone else from suffering the
stigmatizing effects of being suspected of being the accused.27 '
Finally, the adversary system is designed to adjudicate disputes with
an ultimate determination of who is at fault and whether the claims are
warranted.272 The court in T.S.R. correctly noted that the design of
the judicial system is such that a defendant who is accused of
wrongdoing will be exonerated if he is found not guilty or not liable of
whatever crime or tort of which he was accused. 3 If a defendant
receives publicity as a result of the accusation, he most likely will also
receive publicity for his exoneration. 74
V.

PROPOSAL

Defendant-requested anonymity is a difficult issue to resolve, given
the competing interests surrounding anonymous litigation in
general.275 Anonymity serves as a "shield," protecting the privacy
interests of the vulnerable, while permitting them to have their disputes

270. See T.S.R., 671 A.2d at 1074 (holding that the defendant had failed to
demonstrate a protectable privacy interest because granting him anonymous status
would comport with granting all defendants accused of sexual abuse the right to proceed
anonymously); Doe v. Doe, 668 N.E.2d at 1167 (refusing to grant the defendant
anonymity status, reasoning that anyone accused of malpractice or sexual molestation
could assert harm to reputation, embarrassment, and harm to business as a result of the
allegations).
271. See Doe v. Doe, 668 N.E.2d at 1167; T.S.R., 671 A.2d at 1075; A.B.C. v. XYZ
Corp., 660 A.2d 1199, 1204 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995).
272. See Paul L. Haines, Restraining the Overly Zealous Advocate: Time for Judicial
Intervention, 65 IND. L.J. 445, 447 (1990) (noting that the adversary system serves as a
method of adjudicating disputes in an effort to "discern truth and justice").
273. See T.S.R., 671 A.2d at 1075. ( "If the allegations are baseless, public records
and public proceedings are, in part, designed to lead to public exoneration").
274. See Armstrong & Cohen, supra note 212, at 9 (noting that both the allegations
of sexual abuse against Cardinal Bernardin, as well as their ultimate withdrawal, were
covered extensively by the press). By letting the facts and identities of the litigation be
known, "people will be convicted or vindicated in the broad light of day." Id. (quoting
James Serritella, the attorney who defended Cardinal Bernardin against accusations of
sexual abuse).
275. See supra Part IV.A.
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settled in court.2 7 6 However, anonymity also might serve as a
"sword," providing the "manipulative" with a tool to abuse the legal
system. 2 7 Additionally, as the courts' recognition of privacy interests
is expanding, 271 so is the public's interest in knowing the facts of
judicial proceedings.179 Even though the use of pseudonyms in
litigation has been growing over the past thirty years, courts are still
unclear as to what qualifies as a "substantial privacy interest"
warranting granting the plaintiff anonymity, 8 0 much less what
qualifies as a sufficient interest to warrant granting the defendant
anonymity. 28
The best approach to analyzing questions of defendant anonymity is
to adopt a balancing test, weighing the defendant's privacy interest
against the constitutionally protected right of access to judicial
proceedings. 282 This balancing test should be modeled on the
276. Shannon P. Duffy, Defense Says 'Doe' Lied About Herpes; Seeking End To
Anonymity, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Feb. 14, 1996, at 1, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Lglint File (arguing that "[alnonymity ... is a 'necessary shield' to protect the
'truly vulnerable and innocent' ....
); see also supra notes 260-62 and accompanying
text (arguing that litigants might not otherwise bring their actions to court for fear that
revelation of their true identities would result in stigmatization or embarrassment).
277. Duffy, supra note 276, at I ("[Flor the manipulative and deceitful, anonymity
can act as a sword, allowing those who would abuse our legal system to level the most
outrageous claims with impunity while cloaking their case with the undeserved air of
legitimacy"). See also Doe v. Shakur, 164 F.R.D. 359, 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (noting
that fairness considerations dictate that a plaintiff who makes serious allegations
against a defendant should have to proceed with her identity known).
A pseudonymous plaintiff also might use the threat of disclosure as an improper
inducement to coerce the defendant into settlement. See William S. Kleinman, Who Is
Suing You?: John Doe Plaintiffs in the Federal Courts, 61 TEX. L. REV. 554-55 (1982)
(noting that "the worthy defendant may avoid the courtroom and settle the suit merely to
avoid damage to his reputation"). See also Doe v. Doe, 668 N.E.2d 1160, 1162 (Ill.
App. Ct.) (noting that John Doe in Doe v. Doe had claimed that the plaintiff was using
the threat of publicity as an inducement to settle), appeal denied, 675 N.E.2d 632 (I11.
1996).
278. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
279. See Brandes & Weidman, supra note 223, at 3 (noting that "high-profile cases"
are leading to "sensational reporting," triggering new interest in how much the public
truly has a right to know). The authors conclude that "[wihen all is said and done, the
public's right to know ordinarily outweighs the privacy of individuals." Id.
280. See supra notes 90-119 and accompanying text (noting the various standards
and balancing tests utilized by the courts in determining whether or not to grant
plaintiffs anonymous status).
281. Because most cases featuring anonymous defendants contain little or no
discussion as to the propriety of the use of the pseudonyms, the courts are left with little
guidance as to what might justify defendant anonymity. See supra notes 121-50 and
accompanying text.
282. See supra notes 74-119 and accompanying text (discussing the balancing test
adopted by courts when analyzing plaintiff anonymity). See supra Part III.B (discussing
the balancing test used in Diocese Corp., T.S.R., and Doe v. Doe).
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balancing tests conducted by prior courts analyzing both cases of
plaintiff and defendant anonymity. Because open judicial proceedings
promote responsible behavior in the courtroom,283 and because
defendants do not share the same concerns as plaintiffs, 84 the courts
should weigh the public's right of access more heavily than they do
with regard to plaintiff anonymity.7 s Thus, as Doe v. Diocese Corp.,
T.S.R. v. J.C., and Doe v. Doe illustrate, if the defendant's only
privacy interest is the fear of stigmatization or humiliation resulting
from the allegations, the courts should find that the public's right to
know prevails in the balancing test.'
Although defendants may have their own concerns, differing from
those of plaintiffs, that they believe justify anonymity, they, unlike
plaintiffs, have extra protections inherent in the judicial system.' z For
283. See Kleinman, supra note 277, at 554.
Like the ante in a poker game, forcing the plaintiff to stake his fear of
embarrassment or retaliation against the defendant's good name guarantees
that only serious players use the finite number of seats at the table. When the
plaintiff puts his name on the pleadings, he assures the court that there is
substance to his claim and thus provides the defendant with an important
measure of protection against potentially damaging frivolous suits.
Id.
See supra notes 223-31 and accompanying text (noting some other values served by
open proceedings where all parties are identified).
284. See supra notes 261-62 and accompanying text (demonstrating how special
protections are sometimes afforded to plaintiffs in order to encourage them and enable
them to exercise their right to sue).
285. See Doe v. Diocese Corp., 647 A.2d 1067, 1074 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1994)
(noting that one of the "key reasons" for not allowing anonymity to defendants was the
importance of the public interest); Doe v. Doe, 668 N.E.2d 1160, 1167 (I11. App. Ct.)
(stressing the public's interest in knowing the identities of those accused of sexual
abuse), appeal denied, 675 N.E.2d 632 (Ill. 1996); T.S.R. v. J.C., 671 A.2d 1068, 107475 (N.J. Super. t. App. Div. 1996) (stressing the values of open judicial proceedings).
286. See supra Part III.B (discussing Diocese Corp., T.S.R., and Doe v. Doe). But see
Milani, supra note 7, at 1698 (arguing that the risk to the names and reputations of
defendants accused of "stigmatizing intentional torts" does qualify as a sufficient
privacy interest warranting the use of pseudonyms). Note that Milani's proposal was
written before the decisions in T.S.R. and Doe v. Doe were decided. Thus, Milani only
looked to Diocese Corp. and distinguished it because the court stressed that institutions
could not demonstrate personal privacy interests sufficient to warrant anonymity. See
Milani, supra note 7, at 1705. Milani suggested that individual defendants could
demonstrate a sufficient privacy interest enough to warrant anonymity. See id.
(emphasis added).
Additionally, Milani also suggested that whether the plaintiff has been granted
anonymity should be a factor weighing in favor of granting the defendant anonymity.
See id. However, both Diocese Corp. and Doe v. Doe suggest that a "quid pro quo
analysis" is not appropriate where a balancing test is concerned. See Diocese Corp.,
647 A.2d at 1073; Doe v. Doe, 668 N.E.2d at 1166.
287. See supra notes 273-274 and accompanying text.
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example, if defendants are concerned that allegations against them will
result in negative publicity, then they are just as likely to receive
positive publicity if they are exonerated.m Additionally, given that the
defendants who are most likely to request anonymity are often public
figures, the public has an even greater interest in knowing the
allegations against them. 2
If, however, defendants are able to demonstrate a privacy interest
that is substantial, the court should grant them anonymity.2 Just as
in plaintiff anonymity questions, the district court should be given
discretion to determine whether the 29defendant has established a
sufficiently protectable privacy interest. '
VI.

CONCLUSION

The future of defendant-requested anonymity remains unclear in
light of the three most recent state court decisions denying defendants'
requests to proceed under pseudonyms. However, prior case law
illustrates that defendants have been granted anonymous status in the
past. When analyzing questions of defendant anonymity, courts most
likely will adopt the same kind of balancing test that is often used to
determine plaintiff anonymity, weighing the public's interest in open
judicial proceedings against the individual defendant's privacy rights.
If the defendant can demonstrate a substantial privacy interest, the
court may find that he has demonstrated a sufficient need to proceed
anonymously. However, if the defendant can only assert harm to his
reputation or career caused by the allegation of wrongdoing, then the
court most likely will hold that the public's interest in knowing all of
the facts of the case outweighs the defendant's privacy interest.
Although the hurdle is not insurmountable, defendants may face a
288. The press coverage of Cardinal Bernardin and the retracted allegations of sexual
abuse offer an example of how publicity also might assist in the exoneration of
defendants who are improperly accused. See Armstrong & Cohen, supra note 212, § 1, at
9. But see supra notes 256-259 and accompanying text (arguing that the damage caused
by disclosure is irreparable, despite the exoneration).
289. See supra notes 264-266 and accompanying text (discussing how the public has
a greater interest in knowing the affairs of public figures).
290. Because the Supreme Court has not ruled upon an anonymity question, and
because the most recent defendant anonymity cases come from just three states, no set
authority has been established with regard to defendant-requested anonymity. Diocese
Corp., T.S.R., and Doe v. Doe all involved "public figures," which was a significant
factor in the balancing process ultimately tipping the scale in favor of public access.
Diocese Corp. 647 A.2d at 1074; T.S.R., 671 A.2d at 1074; Doe v. Doe, 668 N.E.2d at
1167. However, if a defendant were to raise another kind of privacy concern, a court
might be more willing to grant anonymity.
291. See Lindsey v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 592 F.2d 1118, 1125 (10th Cir. 1979).
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tougher hurdle than plaintiffs in convincing the courts to allow them to
proceed anonymously.
COLLEEN E. MICHUDA

